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A CRITICAL GUIDE TO THE
SECOND AMENDMENT
GLENN HARLAN REYNOLDS[*]
This Symposium contains a number of important articles relating to the Second
Amendment to the United States Constitution. But what many casual readers may not realize is
that those articles are simply the latest installments in what has become a rich and interesting
literature. Although the Second Amendment was almost completely ignored by the academic
community for the first two centuries of its existence, the past several years have seen an
explosion of scholarship.
The reasons for that explosion are beyond the scope of this Article; they may stem in part
from the increased prominence of "gun control" debates in contemporary politics, or from the
natural tendency of constitutional law scholars to look for as yet unmined subjects for study. But
for whatever reason, the past five years or so have undoubtedly seen more academic research
concerning the Second Amendment than did the previous two hundred.
In this Article, I will summarize and criticize that scholarship. By doing so, I hope to
serve two purposes. First, I hope to provide readers who are unfamiliar with the literature
sufficient background to understand references to it in other articles on this issue, or simply to
consider themselves "Second Amendment literate." Second, I hope both to criticize and to
synthesize the literature on the Second Amendment, to suggest fruitful areas for future research,
and to provide my own views on some problems that I consider particularly important. Although
some aspects of Second Amendment theory have been developed with a thoroughness that would
surprise those unfamiliar with the field, other aspects deserve additional study. I hope that readers
of this Article will be inspired to join in the conversation.
I. INTRODUCTION
Before addressing the body of Second Amendment scholarship, it is worth taking a
moment to put it into the context of the popular debate over gun controls and the right to bear
arms. Although it would be something of an oversimplification, it is probably fair to say that
those who support (p.462)gun control have generally tended either to ignore the Second
Amendment entirely or to adopt an interpretation that leaves it essentially without effect.[1]
Those opposed to gun control, on the other hand, have naturally tended to adopt rather strong
interpretations of the Second Amendment.[2] This is not surprising; we see similar phenomena
with regard to other parts of the Bill of Rights. For example, it is common to find "right wing"
opponents of sexual liberty taking the position that the Ninth Amendment,[3] often cited as the
root of the right to privacy that is typically implicated in cases involving sexual freedom,[4]
means nothing. Robert Bork, for example, has described the Ninth Amendment as an "inkblot"
whose meaning cannot be deciphered,[5] and has referred to the right of privacy as a "loose canon
in the law."[6] Supporters of such sexual rights, on the other hand, tend to take rather expansive
views of what the Ninth Amendment protects.[7] Similarly, in the field of free speech
representatives of the media seem often to believe that everything that affects their interests-almost down to the availability of free
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parking near newspaper offices--implicates important First Amendment concerns,
while those opposed to, say, sexually explicit art or flag burning tend to take a much
narrower view.(p.463)
But with regard to most parts of the Bill of Rights, the ability of partisans to make
extreme constitutional arguments is limited by the existence of large bodies of judicial
caselaw and scholarly explication, which set the bounds for respectable discourse on the
subject. In the case of the Second Amendment, at least until a few years ago, there was no
such caselaw or scholarship. Today there is still very little caselaw, but there is now a great
deal of scholarship.[8] So far, however, the scholarship seems to have had less impact on
the public debate in this area than in many others: instead, the debate is driven mostly by
what will make good sound bites and by what will further the direct-mail fundraising of
organizations on both sides of the issue. That may change, and if it does it will probably be
a good thing.
Perhaps surprisingly, what distinguishes the Second Amendment scholarship from that
relating to other constitutional rights, such as privacy or free speech, is that there appears to
be far more agreement on the general outlines of Second Amendment theory than exists in
those other areas. Indeed, there is sufficient consensus on many issues that one can properly
speak of a "Standard Model" in Second Amendment theory, much as physicists and
cosmologists speak of a "Standard Model" in terms of the creation and evolution of the
Universe.[9] In both cases, the agreement is not complete: within both Standard Models are
parts that are subject to disagreement. But the overall framework for analysis, the questions
regarded as being clearly resolved, and those regarded as still open, are all generally agreed
upon. This is certainly the case with regard to Second Amendment scholarship.
Unfortunately, despite the existence of unusually broad areas of scholarly consensus, this
literature has so far had less of a disciplinary effect on public debate than might otherwise
be hoped. Perhaps this Symposium, by increasing the awareness of general readers, will
help to remedy that problem. I will discuss this subject at greater length below.
Of course, a Standard Model among lawyers is not the same thing as a Standard Model
among physicists. For one thing, physicists can revise their theories based on new
experiments and data. Lawyers lack such opportunities. The Supreme Court is the closest
thing we have to a theory-testing device, but the Court does not really serve a theory-testing
purpose. First, as I have suggested elsewhere, prediction of Supreme Court decisions does
little to validate particular theories, given the complexities involved.[10] Second, Supreme
Court decisions change in a way that physical laws do not. (p.464)It would have been
perfectly proper in 1953 to argue that because the Supreme Court had not recognized the
right to integrated schools, such a right did not exist, at least as a legally enforceable matter.
[11] But such an argument would hardly have stated an eternal truth about the Constitution,
or even (as the following year proved)[12] about the Supreme Court's view of the question.
Similarly, the Supreme Court's treatment of the First Amendment until well into this
century was very similar to its treatment of the Second Amendment up to this point.[13]
Though we must all abide by the Supreme Court's decisions, for constitutional scholars the
Supreme Court is another institution to be studied--and, frequently, critiqued--rather than a
source of final answers.
At any rate, with these caveats I will discuss what can fairly be called the "Standard
Model" of Second Amendment interpretation. I will also discuss those aspects of Second
Amendment theory that can be characterized as outside the Standard Model. I will then
make some observations of my own regarding the shortcomings of both Standard Model
and non-Standard Model theories, and will close with a few comments on the way in which
the public debate over the Second Amendment has been influenced (or not) by the scholarly
literature on the subject.
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II. THE STANDARD MODEL
The Second Amendment reads:
A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the
people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.[14]

To modern readers, at least, these words are not particularly clear. What is a "militia"?
What does it mean for one to be "well regulated"? What is a "right of the people"? What
does it mean to "keep and bear arms"? And what sort of infringements on that right are
prohibited?
Until the last decade, the scholarly literature provided little guidance on this subject.
Debate on the subject took place almost exclusively in political speeches, newspaper
editorials, letters to the editor, and the pages of gun (p.465)magazines.[15] Since the
publication of Don Kates' seminal article in the Michigan Law Review,[16] followed by
Sanford Levinson's Yale Law Journal article entitled The Embarrassing Second
Amendment,[17] however, a scholarly debate has flourished, with literally dozens of wellresearched articles, many by eminent authors, addressing the subject.[18] The purpose (p.466)
of these articles is quite specifically to answer the questions set out above. A short summary
of their conclusions follows.
A. The Individual Right to Keep and Bear Arms
Under the Standard Model
The Standard Model is rooted in two main sources: the text of the Second Amendment
and its historical underpinnings. Both are interpreted to support an individual right to keep
and bear arms.[19] The text's support is seen as straightforward: the language used, after all,
is "right of the people," a term that appears in other parts of the Bill of Rights that are
universally interpreted as protecting individual rights. Thus, any argument that the right
protected is not one enforceable by individuals is undermined by the text:
[To deny that the right protected is one enforceable by individuals] the following set of
propositions must be accepted: (1) when the first Congress drafted the Bill of Rights it used
"right of the people" in the first amendment to denote a right of individuals (assembly); (2)
then, some sixteen words later, it used the same phrase in the second amendment to denote a
right belonging exclusively to the states; (3) but then, forty-six words later, the fourth
amendment's "right of the people" had reverted to its normal individual right meaning; (4)
"right of the people" was again used in the natural sense in the ninth amendment; and (5)
finally, in the tenth amendment the first Congress specifically distinguished "the states"
from "the people," although it had failed to do so in the second amendment.[20]

Thus, say Standard Model writers, the Second Amendment protects the same sort of
individual right that other parts of the Bill of Rights provide. To hold otherwise, these
writers argue, is to do violence to the Bill of Rights since, if one "right of the people" could
be held not to apply to individuals, then so could others.[21] Furthermore, as William Van
Alstyne notes, the "right" to which the Second Amendment refers is clearly the right "of the
people, to keep and bear arms."[22] Thus, whatever the meaning of the (p.467)Amendment's
reference to a "well-regulated militia," that reference does not modify the right recognized
by the Amendment.[23]
This textual argument is also supported by reference to history. Standard Model
scholars muster substantial evidence that the Framers intended the Second Amendment to
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protect an individual right to arms.[24] The first piece of evidence for this proposition
is that such a right was protected by the English Bill of Rights of 1689.[25] As such, it
became one of the "Rights of Englishmen" around which the American Revolutionaries
initially rallied.[26] Standard Model scholars also stress that the right to keep and bear arms
was seen as serving two purposes. First, it allowed individuals to defend themselves from
outlaws of all kinds--not only ordinary criminals, but also soldiers and government officials
who exceeded their authority, for in the legal and philosophical framework of the time no
distinction was made between the two.[27] Just as importantly, the presence of an armed
populace was seen as a check on government tyranny and on the power of a standing army.
With the citizenry armed, imposing tyranny would be far more difficult than it would be
with the citizenry defenseless.
Tench Coxe made this point in a commentary on the Second Amendment.[28] Coxe
explained the purpose of the Amendment this way:(p.468)
As civil rulers, not having their duty to the people duly before them, may attempt to
tyrannize, and as the military forces which must be occasionally raised to defend our
country, might pervert their power to the injury of their fellow citizens, the people are
confirmed by the next article in their right to keep and bear their private arms.[29]

Similarly, Madison himself wrote that a regular army that threatened liberty would find
itself opposed by "a militia amounting to near a half a million citizens with arms in their
hands."[30] Madison contrasted the situation in America with that obtaining under the
European governments, whom he described as "afraid to trust the people with arms," and
argued that the new federal government need not be feared because Americans possessed
"the advantage of being armed, which the Americans possess over the people of almost
every other nation."[31]
Standard Model scholars note that these statements were echoed by similar sentiments
from other Framers, all of whom seem to have been proponents of the individual ownership
of firearms. Thomas Jefferson was a vigorous advocate of gun ownership because he
believed that it fostered both personal and societal virtue;[32] a model constitution that he
drafted for (p.469)Virginia in 1776 included a provision guaranteeing that "[n]o Freeman shall
be debarred the use of arms [within his own lands]."[33] Similarly, Anti-Federalist Patrick
Henry agreed, stating that "The great object is that every man be armed.... Every one who is
able may have a gun."[34]
Thus, the right to keep and bear arms was considered an essential form of protection
not just for home and hearth, but also against government tyranny. It can be understood as
yet another of the forms of division of power that the Framers created to protect citizens'
liberties. It is commonplace to note that the Framers divided power within the federal
government, by apportioning it among three branches, and that the Framers divided
government power in general by splitting it between the federal government and the
governments of the states. But under the Standard Model approach it is fair to say that the
Framers divided power yet another way, by ensuring that the citizenry possessed sufficient
military power to offset that of the Federal government. Such a division makes sense in
light of such other (p.470)Constitutional language as the Preamble's statement that the
authority of the government comes from the people, and the similar statement in the Tenth
Amendment.[35] If the federal and state governments are merely agents of the people, it is
logical that the people would be reluctant to surrender a monopoly on military power to
their servants, for fear that their servants might someday become their masters.[36]
This was certainly the view of commentators throughout the nineteenth century. As
Justice Joseph Story wrote in his Commentaries on the Constitution:
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The right of the citizens to keep and bear arms has justly been considered as the palladium
of the liberties of a republic, since it offers a strong moral check against the usurpation and
arbitrary power of rulers, and will generally, even if these are successful in the first
instance, enable the people to resist and triumph over them.[37]

Influential nineteenth-century scholar Thomas Cooley made the same point:
The right of the people to bear arms in their own defence, and to form and drill military
organizations in defence of the State, may not be very important in this country, but it is
significant as having been reserved by the people as a possible and necessary resort for the
protection of self-government against usurpation, and against any attempt on the part of
those who may for the time be in possession of State authority or resources to set aside the
constitution and substitute their own rule for that of the people. Should the contingency ever
arise when it would be necessary for the people to make use of the arms in their hands for
the protection of constitutional liberty, the proceeding, so far from being revolutionary,
would be in strict accord with popular right and duty.[38]

This point is the key underpinning of the standard model's approach. The right to keep and
bear arms exists in the people because it is their for their own protection. Note Cooley's
distinction between the people's "own (p.471)defence" and the "defence of the state." This
distinction carries with it the clear implication that "the people" and "the state" are not the
same thing.
B. The Militia and the People
One modern critic of the Standard Model, Dennis Henigan of the Center to Prevent
Handgun Violence, dismisses this basis for the Second Amendment. Henigan describes
what I call the "Standard Model" as the "insurrectionist theory" of the Second Amendment.
[39] According to Henigan, it is absurd to believe that the Framers intended to include a
right of revolution in the Constitution.[40] Henigan's argument suffers from a number of
problems, not least of which is that in fact the Framers did seem to believe in just such a
right. Aside from the passages quoted above, the 1794 Tennessee Constitution, which was
adopted just after the adoption of the Bill of Rights and which Thomas Jefferson is said to
have described as "the least imperfect and most republican of the state constitutions,"[41]
contains an explicit recognition of the right--and in fact the duty--of citizens to rebel against
a tyrannical government. Article I, Section 1 of the Tennessee Constitution provides:
That all power is inherent in the people, and all free governments are founded on their
authority, and instituted for their peace, safety, and happiness; for the advancement of those
ends they have at all times, an unalienable and indefeasible right to alter, reform, or abolish
the government in such manner as they may think proper.[42]

Article I, Section 2 provides:
That government being instituted for the common benefit, the doctrine of non-resistance
against arbitrary power and oppression is absurd, slavish, and destructive of the good and
happiness of mankind.[43](p.472)

One could hardly ask for a more explicit endorsement of an "insurrectionist theory" than
this. Nor is Tennessee the only state whose constitution dates from the period of the
Framing and contains such a provision.[44] And, of course, the Declaration of
Independence states the same theory.[45] So the argument that a constitutional right of
revolt was unthinkable or absurd to the Framers contradicts some rather obvious historical
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evidence to the contrary. That should come as no surprise, really, when we remember that
the Framers were, after all, revolutionaries themselves.
Nonetheless, there is that troubling language about the "well regulated militia." The
Second Amendment does contain a preamble of sorts, and although there seems little
enthusiasm for paying attention to the Preamble to the Constitution itself,[46] criticism of
arguments in favor of a personal right to bear arms always seems to turn on that point. The
argument is that because the Second Amendment opens with the words, "A well regulated
Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State," it must therefore not protect a right
that can be asserted by individuals. Standard Model scholars disagree. Once again, we will
look first at the text, then at the historical circumstances surrounding it.
First, as William Van Alstyne points out, the "right of the people" described in the
Second Amendment is "to keep and bear arms," not to belong to a militia.
Rather, the Second Amendment adheres to the guarantee of the right of the people to keep
and bear arms as the predicate for the other provision to which it speaks, i.e., the provision
respecting a militia, as distinct from a standing army separately subject to congressional ...
control.... In relating these propositions within one amendment, moreover, it does not
disparage, much less does it subordinate, "the right of the people to keep (p.473)and bear
arms." To the contrary, it expressly embraces that right and indeed it erects the very
scaffolding of a free state upon that guarantee. It derives its definition of a well-regulated
militia in just this way for a "free State": The militia to be well-regulated is a militia to be
drawn from just such people (i.e., people with a right to keep and bear arms) rather than
from some other source (i.e., from people without rights to keep and bear arms).[47]

In other words, the right to keep and bear arms is not subordinate to the purpose of having a
militia--the notion of a "well regulated militia" is subordinate to the purpose of having an
armed citizenry.[48] Furthermore, Van Alstyne points out, the reference in the Second
Amendment's opening clause is "an express reference to the security of a 'free state.' It is
not a reference to the security of THE STATE."[49] Thus, the purpose of the Second
Amendment is to ensure an armed citizenry, from which can be drawn the kind of militia
that is necessary to the survival of a free state.
There is other textual support as well. Significantly, Madison's own proposal for
integrating the Bill of Rights into the Constitution was not to add them at the end (as they
have been) but to interlineate them into the portions of the original Constitution they
affected or to which they related.[50] If he had thought the Second Amendment would alter
the military and/or militia provisions of the Constitution he would have interlineated it in
Article I, Section 8, near or after clauses 15 and 16.[51] Instead, he planned to insert the
right to arms with freedom of religion, the press and other personal rights in Section 9
following the rights against bills of attainder and ex post facto laws.[52] This too supports
the notion that the Second Amendment isn't about making the state militarily strong (an odd
function for one-tenth of the Bill of Rights), but about protecting the rights of people in the
same fashion as those other provisions.
Standard Model scholars cite ample historical evidence to support this reading of the
text. These range from statements of the Framers concerning the makeup of the militia, such
as George Mason's "Who are the militia? They consist now of the whole people,"[53] to
contemporaneous legal documents, such as the Virginia Constitution of 1776, which
describes "a well-regulated militia, composed of the body of the people,"[54] to historical
(p.474)analysis of the colonial militia as it developed from English practice.[55] As Standard
Model writers report, arms-bearing began as a duty, and continued as a right.[56] Citizens
were required to possess arms suitable for militia service, and were liable to show up for
inspection from time to time to prove that they possessed them and knew how to use them,

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=960788

and to receive training in militia tactics. A "well regulated militia" was thus one that
was well-trained and equipped; not one that was "well-regulated" in the modern sense of
being subjected to numerous government prohibitions and restrictions.[57]
Thus, under the Standard Model's interpretation, the language "well regulated militia"
is not a limitation on the right of the people to keep and bear arms, but an outgrowth of that
right. As Don Kates describes matters, "[t]hus, the amendment's wording, so opaque to us,
made perfect sense to the Framers: believing that a militia (composed of the entire people
possessed of their individually owned arms) was necessary for the protection of a free state,
they guaranteed the people's rights to possess those arms."[58] Kates concludes this passage
by stating that "[a]t the very least, the Framers' understanding of 'militia' casts doubt on an
interpretation that would guarantee only the state's right to arm organized military
units."[59](p.475)
C. The Standard Model: A Summary
The picture that emerges from this scholarship is a coherent one, consistent with both
the text of the Constitution and what we know about the Framers' understanding. The
purpose of the right to bear arms is twofold: to allow individuals to protect themselves and
their families, and to ensure a body of armed citizenry from which a militia could be drawn,
[60] whether that militia's role was to protect the nation, or to protect the people from a
tyrannical government. Professor Malcolm writes:
[T]he Second Amendment was meant to accomplish two distinct goals, each perceived as
crucial to the maintenance of liberty. First, it was meant to guarantee the individual's right
to have arms for self-defence and self-preservation. Such an individual right was a legacy of
the English Bill of Rights. This is also plain from American colonial practice, the debates
over the Constitution, and state proposals for what was to become the Second
Amendment....
The second and related objective concerned the militia, and it is the coupling of these
two objectives that has caused the most confusion. The customary American militia
necessitated an armed public, and Madison's original version of the amendment, as well as
those suggested by the states, described the militia as either "composed of" or "including"
the body of the people. A select militia was regarded as little better than a standing army.
[61]

The mainstream scholarly interpretation of the Second Amendment--what I have been
calling the Standard Model--has thus succeeded in making clear the meaning of a text that
many modern readers may find unclear. This is no small accomplishment. It also provides
many useful answers to questions that may occur to some readers, answers that I will
summarize here.
1. The National Guard
One commonplace assertion of newspaper editorialists and others who discuss the
Second Amendment in the popular press is that the National Guard is the "militia" protected
by that Amendment. This is clearly wrong. As mentioned above, the "militia" referred to in
the Second Amendment was to be composed of the entire populace, for only such a body
could serve as a check on the (p.476)government.[62] Indeed, both English and American
history had led Americans to be very suspicious of "select" militias.[63] Such bodies,
composed of those deemed politically reliable by authorities, had played unfortunate roles
in the past,[64] and were regarded with the same suspicion as standing armies. As one
scholar notes, the Framers' references to select militias were "strongly pejorative."[65]
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Today's National Guard, which might more properly be thought of as "troops" than
"militia" anyhow,[66] is a very select militia indeed, and can hardly be expected to
substitute for the "whole body of the people." The National Guard was never designed to
resist a tyrannical government. Rather, the National Guard was created in response to the
perceived shortcomings of the militia as an offensive force; there were repeated incidents in
which the militia refused to invade Canada, Mexico, and various other locations, or in
which federal attempts to so employ the militia were held illegal.[67]
Under the current system, National Guard officers have dual status: they are both
members of the State Guard and members of the federal armed (p.477)forces.[68] They are
armed, paid, and trained by the federal government.[69] They can be called out at will by
the federal government, and such call-outs cannot be resisted, in any meaningful fashion, by
them or by their states.[70] They are subject to federal military discipline on the same basis
as members of the national government's armed forces.[71] And they are required to swear
an oath of loyalty to the United States government, as well as to their states.[72] As one
military officer writes:
By providing for a militia in the Constitution, the Framers sought to strengthen
civilian control of the military. They postulated that a militia composed of citizen-soldiers
would curb any unseemly ambitions of the small standing army. Today's National Guard is
often perceived as the successor to the militia, and observers still tout the Guard's role as the
ultimate restraint on the professional military.
The reality, however, is much different. Today's national guard is a very different
force from the colonial-era militia. With 178,000 full-time federal employees and almost all
of its budget drawn from the federal government, the National Guard is, for all practical
purposes, a federal force. Indeed, one commentator concluded that it is very much akin to
the "standing army" against which the Founding Fathers railed.[73]

It is thus difficult to argue that the "militia" referred to in the Second Amendment is merely
today's National Guard, or, for that matter, any other select governmental body.[74] As
Professor Malcolm states, "[t]he argument that today's National Guardsmen, members of a
select militia, would constitute the only persons entitled to keep and bear arms has no
historical foundation."[75] At any rate, one need look no further than the statute books (p.478)
to see that such an assertion is incorrect: the National Guard and the militia are distinct
entities.[76] At both the federal and state levels, the "unorganized militia" is defined as
essentially the entire population except for the old and the very young--with the difference
that many states include women.[77] Furthermore, of course, neither the National Guard
nor any institution much like it existed at the time of the framing. As Standard Model
scholars point out, this makes any argument that the Second Amendment merely protects
the National Guard untenable.
2. What Weapons are Protected?
Discussion of the right to keep and bear arms seems to lead inevitably to questions of
whether the existence of such a right necessitates the right to own, for instance, a howitzer
or a nuclear weapon. Writers adhering to the Standard Model, which stresses fidelity to the
purposes and history of the Second Amendment, have arrived at fairly convincing answers
to such questions by drawing on those sources.[78]
The right to keep and bear arms is no more absolute than, say, the right to free speech.
Just as the demand "your money or your life" is not protected by the First Amendment, so
the right to arms is not without limits. But the right to arms is no more undone by this fact
than freedom of speech is undone by the fact that that right is not absolute either.
Mainstream scholars of the Second Amendment draw limits from the text and from the
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purpose of the provision.[79] Textually, the language "keep and bear arms" is
interpreted as limiting the arms protected to those (p.479)that an individual can "bear"--that is,
carry.[80] This fact, together with the fact that the right is seen as one pertaining to
individuals, leaves out large crew-served weapons such as howitzers, machine guns, nuclear
missiles, and so on. Presumably individuals (if wealthy and eccentric enough) could "keep"
such weapons, but they could not "bear" them.[81]
Because one purpose of the right is to allow individuals to form up into militia units at
a moment's notice, the kinds of weapons protected are those in general military use, or those
that, though designed for civilians, are substantially equivalent to those military weapons.
[82] Because another purpose is the defense of the home, Standard Model writers also
import common-law limitations on the right to arms, as they existed at the time of the
framing.[83] Under the common law, individuals had a right to keep and bear arms, but not
such arms as were inherently a menace to neighbors, or that had an unavoidable tendency to
terrify the community. Thus, weapons such as machine guns, howitzers, or nuclear weapons
would not be (p.480)permitted.[84] Note however that the much-vilified "assault rifle" would
be protected under this interpretation--not in spite of its military character, but because of it.
The "recreational and sporting uses" often cited by both sides in the contemporary gun
control debate, on the other hand, are not relevant. They are cited by those who favor gun
control in the hopes of not arousing the fears of hunters and target shooters, and by those
who oppose gun control in the hopes of mobilizing those same groups. But they have
nothing to do (directly) with the purpose of maintaining an armed citizenry. Recreation and
sport, to the extent they are protected at all, are covered only penumbrally; the Second
Amendment is not about sport or recreation.[85]
3. Who Has a Right to Keep and Bear Arms?
Despite the claims of some prominent gun-lobby spokespersons, and of a vast number
of radio talk show callers, the Standard Model interpretation of the Second Amendment
does not guarantee a right to keep and bear arms for everyone. The right to arms always
extended beyond the core membership of the militia, encompassing those (like women,
seamen, clergymen, and those beyond the upper age for militia service) who could not be
called out for militia duty. But Standard Model scholars tend to stress that in
classical republican political philosophy, the concept of a right to arms was inextricably and
multifariously tied to that of the "virtuous citizen." Free and republican institutions were
believed to be dependent on civic virtu which, in turn, depended upon each citizen being
armed--and, therefore, fearless, self-reliant, and upright. Since possession of arms was the
hallmark of a citizen's independence, the ultimate expression of civic virtu was his
defensive use of arms against criminals, oppressive officials, and foreign enemies alike.
One implication of this emphasis on the virtuous citizen is that the right to arms does not
preclude laws disarming the unvirtuous (i.e. criminals) or those who, like children or the
mentally unbalanced, are deemed incapable of virtue.[86]

Thus, felons, children, and the insane were excluded from the right to arms precisely as
(and for the same reasons) they were excluded from the franchise--though some (women for
example) who lacked the right to vote nonetheless possessed the right to arms.[87]
Nonetheless, the franchise and (p.481)the right to arms were "intimately linked" in the minds
of the Framers and of prior and subsequent republican thinkers.[88]
This means that the right to arms does not extend to minors, so that the "Gun Free
School Zones Act" overturned in United States v. Lopez,[89] does not violate the Second
Amendment, at least as applied to schoolchildren. Nor does the right extend to felons or the
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insane.[90] Furthermore, licensing laws, background checks, and waiting periods--so
long as all are reasonable and not simply covert efforts at restricting the availability of guns
to those who qualify[91] --do not violate the right, arguments of overzealous gun
enthusiasts to the contrary notwithstanding. After all, the "well regulated militia" of which
every citizen was presumed a part included the necessity of showing up occasionally in
person to prove that one possessed the necessary weapons and knew how to use them.[92]
If that could be required, then it is hard to argue that citizens cannot be required to fill out a
form or two.[93] Similarly, laws regulating the wearing of arms are generally regarded as
acceptable under the Standard Model, although there is some (p.482)dispute on this subject.
[94] The more popular view is that the term "keep" refers to owning arms that are kept in
one's household; the term "bear" refers to the bearing of arms while actually taking part in
militia duties.[95] Thus,
[t]he amendment's language was apparently intended to protect the possession of firearms
for all legitimate purposes, but to guarantee the right to carry them outside the home only in
the course of militia service. Outside that context the only carrying of firearms which the
amendment appears to protect is such transportation as is implicit in the concept of a right to
possess--e.g., transporting them between the purchaser or owner's premises and a shooting
range, or a gun store or gunsmith and so on.[96]

In this light, whatever the asserted benefits of laws that allow citizens to carry weapons
freely, the Standard Model stresses that there is no Second Amendment right to do so-though there may, of course, be Fourteenth Amendment rights not to be discriminated
against in the granting of any such licenses a state may choose to permit.[97]
4. Have Times Changed?
Another argument frequently heard is that the Second Amendment is militarily
obsolete. The argument is that lightly-armed civilians simply cannot defend themselves
against a modern army, and that as a result an armed citizenry would not serve as a remedy
for, or even a deterrent against, a tyrannical government.[98] Thus, the Second Amendment
should not be taken seriously, even if it is admitted that it was intended to protect an armed
citizenry in precisely the fashion described in the Standard Model.(p.483)
It is hard to know what to say about this argument. First, of course, it is something of
an act of faith to believe that any constitutional right will ultimately protect against a
tyrannical government. As the interned American citizens of Japanese descent learned, the
Bill of Rights provided them with little protection when it was needed.[99] And, of course,
there is no guarantee that a free press will prevail over the long term either. Certainly some
tyrannies have arisen in nations where press freedom existed--Weimar Germany, for
example. Yet we do not generally require proof of efficacy where other Constitutional
rights are concerned, so it seems a bit unfair to demand it solely in the case of the Second
Amendment.
At any rate, the argument that irregulars with light arms are ineffective against modern
armies--though no doubt pleasing to the self-esteem of military professionals--is not
especially compelling based on the facts. As I write this article, the Red Army, which many
analysts once thought capable of cutting through the armies of Western Europe like a knife
through cheese, is finding itself sorely tried by the irregulars of the self-proclaimed
Chechen Republic. Though most observers predict eventual victory for the Russian armed
forces, some believe that the fighting will bring down the Yeltsin government, and pretty
much everyone agrees that this will make the Russian authorities less likely to crack down
in the same fashion again: it has just been too expensive.[100] Similarly, a recent peasant
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revolt in Chiapas left the Mexican army and authorities looking rather bad.[101] In my
lifetime, we have seen modern armies defeated or embarrassed by lightly armed irregulars
from Vietnam, to Afghanistan, to Lebanon to Somalia. It thus seems rather believable that
an armed citizenry could frustrate tyranny, or at least make would-be tyrants weigh the high
costs against the dubious benefits of, say, a military coup.[102](p.484)
5. Is the Right Worth the Cost?
The final popular argument against a Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms
is that, regardless of what the right is supposed to accomplish, it is simply too expensive.
That is, with all of the violence in America, the cost of having guns readily available
exceeds any benefit that an armed citizenry might provide.
My usual response to such arguments is that as a professor of constitutional law I am
as sublimely indifferent to the question of whether the availability of guns leads to crime as
I am to the question of whether pornography causes sexual offenses. In either case, the
Constitution has spoken, and that is enough. Such consequential concerns may be relevant
to, say, the question of whether to repeal the First or Second Amendments, but they should
certainly have no role in how we interpret or apply them. I thus leave argument about these
topics to criminologists and the like.[103]
At any rate, Standard Model theorists stress that if we are going to let worries about
costs and benefits affect our interpretation of constitutional rights, we ought to be
consistent.[104] As Professor Levinson puts it:(p.485)
If one does accept the plausibility of any of the arguments on behalf of a strong reading of
the Second Amendment, but, nevertheless, rejects them in the name of social prudence and
the present-day consequences produced by finicky adherence to earlier understandings, why
do we not apply such consequentialist criteria to each and every part of the Bill of Rights?
As Ronald Dworkin has argued, what it means to take rights seriously is that one will honor
them even when there is significant social cost in doing so. If protecting freedom of speech,
the rights of criminal defendants, or any other part of the Bill of Rights were always (or
even most of the time) costless to the society as a whole, it would truly be impossible to
understand why they would be as controversial as they are. The very fact that there are often
significant costs--criminals going free, oppressed groups having to hear viciously racist
speech, and so on--helps to account for the observed fact that those who view themselves as
defenders of the Bill of Rights are generally antagonistic to prudential arguments. Most
often, one finds them embracing versions of textual, historical, or doctrinal argument that
dismiss as almost crass and vulgar any insistence that times might have changed and made
too "expensive" the continued adherence to a given view ... Yet one finds that the tables are
strikingly turned when the Second Amendment comes into play. Here it is "conservatives"
who argue in effect that social costs are irrelevant and "liberals" who argue for a notion of
the "living constitution" and "changed circumstances" that would have the practical
consequence of removing any real bite from the Second Amendment.[105]

Hypocrisy, on both left and right, is the small coin of constitutional debate, at least when
one leaves behind journals with footnotes and enters the realm of Op/Ed pundits and
television talking heads. But the Constitution, and particularly the Bill of Rights, is not a
buffet line from which we can take those items that look appetizing while leaving behind
those that do not appeal. It is a package deal. Thus, arguments that disfavored rights should
be balanced away while favored rights should be retained should be recognized for what
they are. On the other hand, arguments that all of the Bill of Rights should be jettisoned
when inconvenient, though intellectually honest, should also be rejected, in my opinion.
The Bill of Rights does not exist to make it easy for us to do what we want. It exists to
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make it hard for us to do what we shouldn't.
6. Failure of a Condition Precedent
There is one argument against giving present day meaning to the Second Amendment
that cannot be dealt with quite so easily. That is David Williams' argument in his The
Terrifying Second Amendment.[106] Williams neither dismisses the Standard Model nor
argues that regardless of its reasoning its conclusions should be dismissed. Instead,
Williams criticizes the right to keep and bear arms from within the Standard Model's
framework.(p.486)
In short, Williams agrees that the Framers intended the militia to be universal, and that
the National Guard is not the "well regulated militia" that the Second Amendment
envisions.[107] Williams writes:
Those who support a states' rights view of the militia seek to identify the Amendment's
militia with the National Guard. The guard, however, is a select body, only a fraction of the
population....
....
The universal militia, by contrast, was the people under another name; it could not
turn against the people because it was the people. As the National Guard is not universal, it
cannot serve as a substitute.[108]

Unlike others who work within the Standard Model, however, Williams does not see the
Second Amendment as creating an individual right to keep and bear arms in today's society.
[109] He believes this for two reasons. First, gun owners are no more "universal" than the
National Guard--that is, although some people in every demographic category own guns,
gun owners are disproportionately white, middle-class men, especially from the South.[110]
Thus, gun ownership represents not a universal classification, but merely another division
within society.[111] "Such people," he writes, "may believe that their welfare is equivalent
to the common good, but it is not. If we have an armed revolution, it will be in the interests
of these citizens, not of the population as a whole."[112]
Second, Williams argues that the ideal of the militia was founded on notions of public
service and widespread virtue that are not present today. In the absence of these "conditions
precedent," the basic purpose of the Second Amendment cannot be fulfilled. I am sorry to
say that there is something to this argument. One way of understanding it is to look at the
other Constitutional institution most like the militia: the jury. Although the ideal and
function of the jury are based on the kinds of notions of universal representation and service
that also underlie the militia, no one familiar with the actual operation of the jury system
thinks that it is either universal or representative. In a society that finds it hard to get
citizens to show up for jury duty, it is perhaps too much to expect that they will show up for
militia service.
But that is the problem with Williams' analysis: it is one of those arguments that
"proves too much." If the failure of universality and publicspiritedness means that the
Second Amendment's rights are now passé, then it is hard to see why the jury system should
not go too. Yet we still take (p.487)the right of trial by jury quite seriously, even if the
citizenry is not very good at meeting its obligations. And efforts to address this problem
tend to revolve around ways of making citizens show up for jury duty, rather than
abolishing the jury. There seems no good reason to treat militia service differently.
The same is true for universality of gun ownership. I will take as true Williams'
assertion that gun-owners are disproportionately white Southern males, though in doing so I
can't help recalling Humphrey Bogart's famous statement in Casablanca that there are some
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sections of New York City that it would be safer not to invade.[113] But there is a
solution to that problem, too: If gun ownership is essential to give the Second Amendment
meaning, then simply require everyone to own a gun (and to go through the necessary
training to use it responsibly). That isn't such a stretch, really, as it is precisely what the first
Congress did to ensure just the universality that Williams considers so important. It did so
by passing the Militia Act of 1792.[114] That act established a "Uniform Militia throughout
the United States," consisting of every able-bodied male citizen between the ages of 18 and
45 and provided
[t]hat every citizen so enrolled and notified, shall, within six months thereafter, provide
himself with a good musket or firelock, a sufficient bayonet and belt, two spare flints, and a
knapsack, a pouch with a box therein to contain not less than twenty-four cartridges, suited
to the bore of his musket or firelock, each cartridge to contain a proper quantity of powder
and ball: or with a good rifle, knapsack, shot-pouch and powderhorn, twenty balls suited to
the bore of his rifle, and a quarter of a pound of powder, and shall appear, so armed,
accoutred and provided, when called out to exercise, or into service, except, that when
called out on company days to exercise only, he may appear without a knapsack.[115]

As this action of the first Congress illustrates, such an approach is far more consistent with
the Second Amendment than simply ignoring it would be. That we have fallen away from
the Framers' ideals, after all, may be more of a reflection on us than on them. Furthermore,
universal militia service might even help to reestablish the kind of civic virtue that all of us
wish were present today.[116] After decades of steadily increasing gun control, mandatory
gun ownership might seem a bit hard to swallow, but in truth there is more historical
precedent in this country for the requirement to own a gun than for a prohibition against
doing so.[117](p.488)
Please note that neither I, nor any Standard Model scholar of whom I am aware, argues
that individual gun ownership should be made mandatory. However, if the complaint is that
less-than-universal gun ownership renders the Second Amendment meaningless, then this
answer does tend to present itself rather forcefully. And while universal armament might be
hard to accomplish, it is unlikely to be any harder than universal disarmament, based on the
experience of gun control efforts over the last several decades. Note too that the Standard
Model does not support what Don Kates correctly calls "the gun lobby's obnoxious habit of
assailing all forms of regulation on Second Amendment grounds."[118] Under the Standard
Model there are important limits on who may keep and bear arms, and on what kind of arms
may be owned. But unlike the arguments of either the rabid pro- or antigun lobbies, the
Standard Model draws its conclusions from the text, history, and structure of the
Constitution in a principled way. These principles do not make Standard Model conclusions
right as a matter of social policy--we remain free to decide, as we have in the past, that the
Constitution is sufficiently wrong on an issue to be worth amending[119] --but they do
make Standard Model conclusions formidable as a matter of constitutional law.
III. THE STATES' RIGHT MODEL
No discussion of the Second Amendment would be complete without at least some
reference to the other competing model of Second Amendment interpretation, the "states'
right" or "collective right" model. In short, this alternative model provides that the Second
Amendment protects not a right of individuals, but only a right of the States. Thus, the right
protected is simply the right of states to have a "well regulated militia."
The most obvious flaw of this theory is the failure of its own proponents to take it
seriously. As I argue at much greater length elsewhere,[120] a "states' rights" interpretation
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of the Second Amendment would do far more than is generally advertised. The states'
rights theory is normally brought out as part of an argument that the Second Amendment
does not provide an individual right to keep and bear arms; such a right, it is argued, exists
only as part of a state militia. The purpose of such militias is to maintain a military
counterweight to the federal government's standing army, and the right is thus assertable
only by states, not individual citizens.(p.489)
For example, gun-control activist Dennis Henigan[121] writes that "The purpose of the
[Second] Amendment was to affirm the people's right to keep and bear arms as a state
militia, against the possibility of the federal government's hostility, or apathy, toward the
militia."[122] He describes his interpretation of the Second Amendment as providing "that
the Second Amendment guarantees a right of the people to be armed only in service to an
organized militia,"[123] and argues that James Madison interpreted the Amendment as
ensuring
that the Constitution does not strip the states of their militia, while conceding that a strong,
armed militia is necessary as a military counterpoint to the power of the regular standing
army.... Madison saw the militia as the military instrument of state government, not simply
as a collection of unorganized, privately armed citizens. Madison saw the armed citizen as
important to liberty to the extent that the citizen was part of a military force organized by
state governments, which possesses the people's 'confidence and affections,' and 'to which
the people are attached.' This is hardly an argument for the right of people to be armed
against government per se.[124]

In Henigan's view, which seems representative of the "states' rights" camp,[125] the
purpose of the Second Amendment is to guarantee the (p.490)existence of state military forces
that can serve as a counterweight to a standing federal army. Thus, it seems fair to say, the
scope of any rights enjoyed by the states under the Second Amendment would be
determined by the goal of preserving an independent military force not under direct federal
control.
But the existence of such a right on the part of states would be a very big deal, going
far beyond the abolition of any direct protection for individuals under the Second
Amendment. If states possess a constitutional right, as against the federal government, to
maintain militias (or "state armies" as former Chief Justice Burger calls them) then the
Second Amendment works a pro tanto repeal of many of the restrictions on state military
power contained in Article I, Section 10 of the Constitution. Furthermore, if states have a
right to maintain their own militias, independent of federal control, then they obviously
must have the right to equip those militias as they see fit. Otherwise, the "right" would be
meaningless, as the federal government could, by regulating weaponry, render the
counterweight ineffectual.
Since many states would balk at spending the money to buy guns for their citizens,
quite a few might do what Congress did in 1792: require (or at least permit) their citizens to
own military-type weapons, perhaps even including machine guns, howitzers, and the like.
[126] If they did so, federal gun-control laws would necessarily be preempted, since
otherwise the state right would mean nothing. So the states' rights interpretation necessarily
leads to a power on the part of states to nullify federal gun control laws simply by allowing
their citizens to possess weapons as part of a militia. Note again that the Congressional
power to supervise the arming and training of the militia, contained in Article I, Section 10
clause 16 would have to be viewed as modified by the Second Amendment if we are to give
the states' rights interpretation meaning.
One might try to avoid this problem by simply declaring that the National Guard is the
"militia" that the states have a right to maintain, but this argument has two problems. First,
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for reasons set out above,[127] it is pretty obviously not true. Second, if the National
Guard is the militia, then it is unconstitutional under the Second Amendment because it is
not sufficiently independent. After all, an institution that is to serve as a counterweight to
the federal standing army can hardly fulfill that function if it is as thoroughly dominated by
the federal government as the present-day National Guard is. Whatever the National Guard
is, it is not a "state (p.491)army." It is, rather, a federally funded and controlled force with a
(very) thin facade of state control.[128] The Supreme Court so reasoned in Perpich v.
United States.[129] In Perpich, the Supreme Court addressed the question of what
limitations are imposed on the National Guard under the militia clauses.[130] The question
before the Court was whether state governors could prevent their National Guard units from
being sent abroad for controversial training missions in Central America.[131] In short, the
Court concluded that Congress' powers to raise armies and make war, rather than its militia
powers, were implicated.[132] While not dispositive on the issue we are discussing--the
Court did not discuss the Second Amendment at all--this case suggests that the National
Guard should be viewed constitutionally as it really is--as a federal, not a state, army.
Furthermore, the states' right theory is based on a discredited (and always unsound)
notion of relationships within our federal system. Under the classical view of the
Constitution, authority is delegated by the people to two kinds of governments, state and
federal. State governments are not creations of the federal government, nor is the federal
government the creature of the states. Both exercise authority delegated to them by the true
sovereigns, the people.[133] The real question to be asked in assessing any governmental
action is whether that action is consistent with the authority delegated by the people, or
whether it exceeds that authority and is thus ultra vires.[134]
But there is another view. In this view, the state governments represent the "real"
governments of the people. The federal government exists as a somewhat mistrusted agent
of the states, with states retaining the power to protect their people (and themselves) by
checking the actions of the federal government where necessary to prevent overreaching.
This seems to be the view embodied by the states' rights interpretation, in which "state
armies" are set against the federal government, and in which state legislators retain the
power to nullify federal firearms laws that would otherwise frustrate state prerogatives.
[135](p.492)
If applied across the board, this view would have rather dramatic consequences, going
far beyond those outlined above. States' rights, and a view of state governments as
interposed between the federal government and their citizens, after all, formed the core of
the losing argument in Brown v. Board of Education[136] --and, for that matter, of the Civil
War.[137] Yet if we are to decide that the Second Amendment embodies this general theory
of the relations between the state and federal governments, there seems no reason to assume
that the Framers had different intentions elsewhere in the same Constitution. Thus, unless
we are to be entirely incoherent, we must seriously consider rethinking constitutional
history all the way back to Brown, and indeed to McCulloch v. Maryland.[138] Yet it seems
unlikely that we will be willing to go that far.
The view of states as the primary constituents of our Constitution, though it has an
ancient (if not always honorable) history, is not one that enjoys great esteem or adherence
today given the past circumstances of its invocation. Nor is it particularly consistent with
either the language or the history of the Constitution. State's rights theorists make much of
the Second Amendment's "preamble," but the Constitution's Preamble, after all, states that
the Constitution was ordained and established by "We the (p.493)People," not "We the
States."[139] Furthermore, the Constitution was ratified by special conventions of the
people, not by state legislatures.[140]
These are rather important issues, but they have not been raised, much less addressed,
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by the proponents of the states' rights theory. It is no accident that most of those
writers are not practicing academics, but politicians and issue-oriented activists.[141] If I
may mix my scientific metaphors, the states' rights theory may be analogized to "creation
science," a mishmash of unconnected observations and non sequiturs intended to compete
with the theory of evolution. "Creation science" is not really science at all, of course: it is
just a propaganda tool for those of certain religious persuasions in the public-relations battle
against evolutionary theory. Realizing that it takes a theory to kill a theory, they came up
with one of their own. But "creation science" does not work from the bottom up,
synthesizing research into a coherent approach. It works from the top down, starting with its
conclusions and looking for evidence that supports them whether or not it forms a
consistent whole.[142] Similarly, the states' rights interpretation of the Second Amendment,
which pays little attention to text, history, or structural sense, is not really constitutional
law. It is simply a slogan.
That is probably why advocates of the states' rights theory are short on specific
historical evidence. As Stephen Halbrook puts it:
In recent years it has been suggested that the Second Amendment protects the "collective"
right of states to maintain militias, while it does not protect the right of "the people" to keep
and bear arms. If anyone entertained this notion in the period during which the Constitution
and Bill of Rights were debated and ratified, it remains one of the most closely guarded
secrets of the eighteenth century, for no known writing surviving from the period between
1787 and 1791 states such a thesis.[143](p.494)

Indeed, as Don Kates points out, the states' rights theory did not appear until this century,
when it seemed necessary to uphold gun control laws--primarily intended to disarm black
people and immigrants--against Second Amendment challenge.[144]
At a time when the mainstream white Anglo-Saxon leadership felt threatened by
immigrants, gun-control laws such as New York's Sullivan Law were intended to address its
fears. In the face of an unprecedented wave of immigration, largely made up of those whom
Americans of Northern European descent found strange and threatening, Framing-era faith
in an armed citizenry and in the sovereignty of the people failed. In fact, as James Fallows
reports, many at the time felt that "[t]hose Italians and Greeks and Jews looked so different
and disturbing"[145] that many were driven to adopt the nativist position that such
immigrants could never become a real part of American society because "'races may change
their religions, their form of government, and their languages, but underneath they may
continue the PHYSICAL, MENTAL, and MORAL CAPACITIES and INCAPACITIES
which determine the REAL CHARACTER of their RELIGION, GOVERNMENT, and
LITERATURE.'"[146] According to Fallows, this concern led to an increased interest in
tests and licensing for the professions as a means of keeping immigrants out.[147] It also
led to an increased interest in licensing firearms.
As David Kopel writes:
New York State passed the 1911 Sullivan Law to license handguns while the New York
Tribune complained about pistols found "chiefly in the pockets of ignorant and quarrelsome
immigrants of law-breaking propensities" and condemned "the practice of going armed ...
among citizens of foreign birth." The New York Times noted the affinity of "low-browed
foreigners" for handguns. Even before the Sullivan Law, the New York City police had
been canceling pistol permits in the Italian sections of the city.... In the first three years of
the Sullivan Law, 70 percent of those arrested had Italian surnames.[148]

Nor was New York the only state to follow this approach; in fact, it was widespread
wherever "out" groups frightened the establishment. In the West, it was Chinese and
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Japanese immigrants[149] who frightened the establishment into enacting restrictive gun
laws; in the South it was (p.495)Americans of African descent.[150] Indeed, one Florida
judge went so far as to write about Florida's weapons law that:
I know something of the history of this legislation. The original Act of 1893 was passed
when there was a great influx of negro laborers in this State drawn here for the purpose of
working in the turpentine and lumber camps. The same condition existed when the Act was
amended in 1901 and the Act was passed for the purpose of disarming negro laborers and to
thereby reduce the unlawful homicides that were prevalent in turpentine and saw-mill
camps and to give the white citizens in sparsely settled areas a better feeling of security. The
statute was never intended to he applied to the white population and in practice has never
been so applied.[151]

Not surprisingly, an effort to disarm citizens deemed undesirable, inferior, or not
sufficiently submissive is hardly consistent with the Second Amendment's notions of
popular sovereignty, fearless, self-reliant citizens, and an individual right to bear arms.
Thus, such actions were justified by the invocation of a new theory. Instead of placing the
right to keep and bear arms in individuals--which necessarily would include members of
groups whom many in the establishment did not trust--the argument was that the Second
Amendment placed the right to arms in the very state governments that were then busy
disarming "undesirable" groups. This "states' rights" argument thus served the same purpose
as most "states' rights" arguments--to protect a racially discriminatory power structure from
constitutional scrutiny.
Advocates of the states' rights argument do not confront this issue. But the recent and
rather unadmirable provenance of the states' rights theory suggests why that theory's
advocates spend little time on the historical record: it's bad salesmanship. It is also why they
make no effort to explain the contradictions and constitutional absurdities that would result
from efforts to take the state's rights approach seriously. The states' rights argument was
never meant to be taken seriously; it was always simply a justification for statutes aimed at
disarming untrustworthy segments of the populace.
Of course, nowadays many believe that the entire populace, not simply some raciallyor nationally-defined segment of it, is untrustworthy where weapons are concerned. This
may or may not be true. However, such a (p.496)view is certainly inconsistent with that
embodied in the Second Amendment. If that view is to receive legal effect, it must be in
spite of the Second Amendment, not because of it.
IV. THE CASES
Although there is not much caselaw regarding the right to keep and bear arms, there is
some. What is fascinating is that it has been embraced by both sides in the gun control
debate. On examination, however, it appears to support the Standard Model's views to the
extent that it has much to say at all.
A. The Supreme Court Cases
The Supreme Court has not often considered the Second Amendment. In several
nineteenth-century cases, the Court refused to enforce the right to keep and bear arms
against states because of its then-applicable doctrine, as announced in Barron v. Baltimore
[152] and the Slaughter-House Cases,[153] that neither the Bill of Rights nor the
Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges and Immunities guarantee was directly enforceable
against the states.
In United States v. Cruikshank,[154] the Supreme Court held that the Second
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Amendment's right to keep and bear arms, along with the First Amendment's right of
assembly, could not be enforced against the states.[155] A case involving claims brought by
the United States against members of the Ku Klux Klan who were charged, inter alia, with
violating black citizens' rights of assembly and to bear arms, Cruikshank is still cited for the
proposition that the Second Amendment does not apply against the states, and the Supreme
Court has not overturned that holding, not having heard a Second Amendment case since
1939. Still, this appears to be a rather slender reed--certainly Cruikshank's holding that the
First Amendment is inapplicable to the states is long gone, and no one would argue to the
contrary today. Cruikshank is also sometimes cited for the proposition that the right to arms
is a preexisting natural right that is somehow not really part of the Constitution at all, based
on the following language:
The right ... is that of "bearing arms for a lawful purpose." This is not a right granted by the
Constitution. Neither is it in any manner dependent on that instrument for its existence. The
second amendment guarantees (p.497)that it shall not be infringed, but this, as has been seen,
means that it shall not be infringed by Congress. This is one of the amendments that has no
other effect than to restrict the powers of the national government.[156]

It is hard to make too much of this, for two reasons. First, the Court had just finished saying
the same thing about the First Amendment:
The particular amendment now under consideration assumes the existence of the right of the
people to assemble for lawful purposes, and protects it against encroachment by Congress.
The right was not created by the amendment; neither was its continuance guaranteed, except
as against congressional interference.[157]

Thus, relying on Cruikshank for the proposition that the Second Amendment applies only
against Congress requires either an acceptance that the First Amendment is also
inapplicable against the states, or a convincing explanation of why our understanding of the
First Amendment should be updated, while our treatment of the Second Amendment should
remain in the pre-incorporation era. Nor is it possible to do much with the argument that the
right to keep and bear arms "is not a right granted by the Constitution," nor is "in any
manner dependent on that instrument for its existence." After all, the Court said much the
same thing about the First Amendment: that right "was not created by the amendment;
neither was its continuance guaranteed." Yet no one has been arguing that this language
means that somehow the First Amendment does not create an enforceable right.
In fact, the argument that the Court's language about rights predating the Constitution
somehow makes them unenforceable runs into more recent trouble than that. In Griswold v.
Connecticut,[158] the case in which the Supreme Court struck down Connecticut's law
against contraception as violative of the right of privacy, the Court referred to the right of
privacy in similar terms: "We deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights-older than our political parties, older than our school system."[159] Yet no one would argue
that Justice Douglas was not referring to a right that was enforceable by individuals against
the states. Quite the contrary, even though the right that Douglas was describing was the
product of penumbral reasoning, and was not specifically protected by the Bill of Rights,
which the right to keep and bear arms, of course, is.[160] At any rate, if the fact that the
Court calls a right "older than the Constitution" (p.498)means that it is unenforceable by
individuals against state governments, nearly all of the Court's sexual liberty jurisprudence
stemming from Griswold[161] would have to go. That seems rather drastic, and certainly
counterintuitive.
Similar arguments can be made with regard to the later cases of Presser v. Illinois
[162] and Miller v. Texas.[163] Decided in an era when incorporation of the Bill of Rights

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=960788

against the states was not the law, they are of dubious authority today when it has
become the rule. At the very least, there should be some principled reason why the doctrine
of incorporation should not apply to the Second Amendment, when it is routinely applied to
other rights that these cases also held not applicable against the states. Such caselaw may
justify a very cautious Court of Appeals' refusal to stick its neck out in advance of Supreme
Court action,[164] but can hardly stand for the proposition that the Second Amendment
should never be regarded as enforceable against the states. These cases, after all, are not
exactly spring chickens. All predate Plessy v. Ferguson[165] and in fact could be viewed as
part of the build-up to Plessy, since the end result was disarmed blacks who could look for
protection only to the very state governments that were turning against and disenfranchising
them.[166](p.499)
Still, even accepting the argument that the Second Amendment is applicable only
against the federal government, we are left with the question of what it covers and who can
invoke it. Unfortunately, there is really only one Supreme Court case offering much
guidance on that subject. That case is United States v. Miller,[167] a 1939 case that offers
only a modicum of help.
In brief, Miller involved a challenge to the National Firearms Act of 1934, which
sharply limited private ownership of such gangster-associated weapons as sawed-off
shotguns and submachineguns.[168] The defendants were indicted for possession of a
sawed-off shotgun in violation of the Act, and challenged that indictment in District Court
on Second Amendment grounds.[169] They won in the District Court and the case went to
the Supreme Court on only one question: whether it was proper to take judicial notice of
whether a sawed-off shotgun was a "militia weapon" and hence protected by the Second
Amendment, or whether such a finding required evidentiary proceedings.[170]
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that evidentiary hearings were required.[171] In
a somewhat confusing opinion the Court reviewed the history of the militia and its character
of being made up of the "all males physically capable of acting in concert for the common
defense.... And further, that ordinarily when called for service these men were expected to
appear bearing arms supplied by themselves and of the kind in common use at the
time."[172] It thus held that
In the absence of any evidence tending to show that possession or use of "a shotgun having
a barrel of less than eighteen inches in length" at this time has some reasonable relationship
to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia, we cannot say that the Second
Amendment guarantees the right to keep and bear such an instrument. Certainly it is not
within judicial notice that this weapon is any part of the ordinary military equipment or that
its use could contribute to the common defense. Aymette v. State, 2 Humphreys (Tenn.) 154,
158.[173]

As a result, the Court remanded the case to the district court for further fact-finding
proceedings.[174](p.500)
Miller, being addressed to a rather limited issue, thus doesn't answer a lot of our
questions. But there are some important lessons to be learned nonetheless. First, Miller
cannot plausibly be read to support the "states' rights" position: if the Second Amendment
protected only a right of states to have militias, not enforceable by individuals--as "states'
right" theorists claim--then factfinding would not have been necessary. Instead, the court
would have had to ask only one question: "Is Mr. Miller a state?" And, if the answer was no
(as, of course, it was) the case would then have been dismissed for lack of standing.
But the case was not dismissed for lack of standing.[175] Instead, the Court appears to
have taken Mr. Miller's claim seriously, but concluded that it called for the kind of
factfinding normally done in a District Court, and for that reason sent the case back for
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further proceedings. Since the Court took Mr. Miller's claim seriously, we can
conclude that the Court believed that the Second Amendment protects some sort of
individual right to keep and bear arms, even if the precise nature of that right is unclear.
Beyond that, it is risky to draw any additional conclusions: the opinion is simply not very
clear.[176]
B. Some Tennessee Observations
While Miller is not very clear, the opinion does draw its language from the important
Tennessee case of Aymette v. State,[177] which held that the kinds of weapons protected are
those that are "part of the ordinary military equipment."[178] Thus, at the risk of seeming
provincial, I wish to explore some of the Tennessee caselaw on the subject. I claim two
grounds beyond geography for doing so. First, the Supreme Court's citation of Aymette,
[179] and its use of the same language, suggests that the Court felt that the rights protected
by the Second Amendment were coterminous with those protected under the similar
provision in the Tennessee Constitution.[180] This must be true, since Aymette quite clearly
concerns only the right to keep and bear arms under the Tennessee Constitution.[181]
Second, the Tennessee cases (p.501)are generally regarded as among the most important state
cases on the right to bear arms: Aymette and its successor Andrews v. State[182] are, for
example, among the very few state cases included in Robert Cottrol's very helpful three
volume collection Gun Control and the Constitution.[183]
Article I, Section 26 of the Tennessee Constitution provides: "That the citizens of this
State have a right to keep and bear arms for their common defense; but the legislature shall
have power, by law, to regulate the wearing of arms with a view to prevent crime."[184] In
commonsensical fashion, the courts of Tennessee have interpreted this to mean pretty much
exactly what it says.[185] In so doing, they have addressed some issues that remain mostly
theoretical in the context of the Second Amendment to the federal Constitution.
In Aymette, the defendant--like those Rambo wannabes who are responsible for the
term "gun nut" today--claimed that the Tennessee provision
gives to every man the right to arm himself in any manner he may choose, however unusual
or dangerous the weapons he may employ, and, thus armed, to appear wherever he may
think proper, without molestation or hindrance, and that any law regulating his social
conduct, by restraining the use of any weapon or regulating the manner in which it shall be
carried, is beyond the legislative competency to enact, and is void.[186]

In answering the question of whether this was what the right to keep and bear arms
protected, the Court said:
[E]very free white man may keep and bear arms. But to keep and bear arms for what? ...
The object, then, for which the right of keeping and bearing arms is secured is the defence
of the public. The free white men may keep arms to protect the public liberty, to keep in
awe those who are in power, and to maintain the supremacy of the laws and the
constitution.... (p.502)As the object for which the right to keep and bear arms is secured is of a
general and public nature, to be exercised by the people in a body, for their common
defence, so the arms the right to keep which is secured are such as are usually employed in
civilized warfare, and that constitute the ordinary military equipment. If the citizens have
these arms in their hands, they are prepared in the best possible manner to repel any
encroachments upon their rights by those in authority. They need not, for such a purpose,
the use of those weapons which are usually employed in private broils, and which are
efficient only in the hands of the robber and the assassin.... The right to keep and bear them
is not, therefore, secured by the constitution.[187]
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From this language, it is easy to see why the Miller Court quoted Aymette on the
question of how a sawed-off shotgun should be treated. It is also important to note that the
very same passage supports an individual, rather than a state, right: "every free white man
may keep and bear arms."[188] Furthermore, the same passage also provides a stated
purpose--"to keep in awe those who are in power"--that sounds an awful lot like the
Standard Model that Dennis Henigan derides as a mere "insurrectionist theory."[189]
The other major Tennessee case, Andrews v. State[190] addresses some other
questions of current interest. Andrews involved defendants who were charged with violation
of a statute forbidding "any person to publicly or privately carry a dirk, sword-cane,
Spanish stiletto, belt or pocket pistol or revolver."[191] They argued that the prosecution
violated their rights under both the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution
and under the right to keep and bear arms clause of the Tennessee Constitution.[192] The
Court, in those pre-incorporation days, dismissed the Second Amendment claim with a
reference to Barron v. Baltimore.[193]
It was the second question that raised real issues. The Attorney General of Tennessee
argued that the right to keep and bear arms was a mere "political right" that existed for the
benefit of the state and, hence, could be regulated at pleasure by the state.[194] The Court,
however, did not agree.(p.503)
In short, the Tennessee Supreme Court examined many of the same historical sources
relied upon by Standard Model scholars, and arrived at the same conclusions. It
distinguished between the "keeping" of arms, which involved private possession, and the
"bearing" of arms, which had to do with militia service.[195] The Court observed:
Bearing arms for the common defense may well be held to be a political right, or for the
protection and maintenance of such rights, intended to be guaranteed; but the right to keep
them, with all that is implied fairly as an incident to this right, is a private individual right,
guaranteed to the citizen, not the soldier.[196]

The court concluded that citizens have the right to keep military-type weapons,[197] and to
engage in the necessary practice, repair, and transportation of such weapons, even in the
absence of any specific militia connection.[198] The Court specifically noted that the
militia was by then already a nearly defunct organization, preserved in the state and federal
constitutions (p.504)and in the statute books but otherwise of no practical consequence.[199]
The Court held, however, that this did not affect the substance of the constitutional rights.
[200] It upheld the statute as it applied to non-military weapons, but held that as applied to
repeating pistols, which the Court said were military weapons, the statute was
unconstitutional.[201] This case remains the leading case in Tennessee today, and its
principles continue to control.[202]
C. Lessons from the Cases
From these cases, then, we can learn the following: that the right to keep and bear
arms is an individual right, not a states' right; that it consists of the right of law-abiding
adult citizens to keep weapons that are of the "ordinary military equipment," or similar
civilian arms, and to engage in the associated practice, maintenance, transport, etc.; that this
does not create an unlimited right to wear such weapons; and that the desuetude of the
militia as an organized social institution does not affect the right.[203] These are precisely
the conclusions of the Standard Model scholars.[204]
In light of both the Federal and the Tennessee cases, then, it seems clear that the
Standard Model enjoys substantial support. This should come as no great surprise, given
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that the Standard Model represents an effort to deal faithfully with a rather large body
of generally consistent historical and textual material.[205] There may still be uncertainties
in terms of translating the Standard Model's conclusions into answers to concrete legal
questions (for example, does the Standard Model mean that hunting rifles receive less
protection than "assault weapons" because the latter are better suited to militia service?) but
the basic framework is there.
There is, however, one major ground for criticism left. That criticism is my own, and
has to do with the ultimate purpose behind the right to keep and bear arms: protection
against a tyrannical government.
V. YOU SAY YOU WANT A REVOLUTION?
The Standard Model stresses the role of an armed populace as a protection against a
tyrannical government. And, as Professors Cottrol and Diamond point out, on a purely
practical level it may make more sense for individuals to arm (p.505)against their own
government than to arm against potential invaders.[206] Cottrol and Diamond quote
Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights John Shattuck to the effect that "[i]n the
twentieth century the number of people killed by their own governments under authoritarian
regimes is four times the number killed in all this century's wars combined."[207] They thus
argue:
We have, in the twentieth century, seen the rise of monstrous states capable of deprivations
of liberty far in excess of anything that the English Whigs who authored the Declaration of
Rights of 1689--or their American successors in 1791--could have envisioned.... That, in the
light of the history of the twentieth century, those we rely on for serious constitutional and
political commentary have failed to examine the issues of whether the state should have a
monopoly of force and whether an armed population might still play an important role in
deterring governmental excesses bespeaks a dangerous intellectual cowardice, a selfimposed limit on political and constitutional discourse that causes us largely to ignore one
of the most critical questions of our time.[208]

I have no argument with this point. And if SS liquidation units, or their modern-day
American equivalent, ever show up at our doors we will not need much in the way of
constitutional theory to tell us what to do.
But one can grant that prevention of genocide and mass murder--or at least rendering it
vastly more difficult and costly for their perpetrators--is a good reason for a right to keep
and bear arms without believing that it is the only reason. Nor does the Standard Model
suggest that prevention of such horrors is the primary reason for the Second Amendment.
Indeed, the very fact that our century's many government-sponsored killing sprees are far
beyond what the Framers might have imagined suggests that the right to keep and bear arms
exists not simply to deal with such worst-case scenarios, but also to deal with lesser
instances of tyranny. After all, compared with the monster regimes of our century, the
British government against which our predecessors revolted was rather nice, really.
Nonetheless, the Framers found ample reason for revolt.
Yet Standard Model scholars have paid almost no attention to the question of when
such a revolt would be justified.[209] One can understand why those who are working in
what, to much of the academic community, is already a somewhat suspect field are a bit
reluctant to take this additional step, but the question is an important one. If we have the
right to keep and bear arms in no small part so that, in the last resort, we can rise up and
overthrow a tyrannical government, then one important aspect of the right would seem to be
some basis (p.506)for agreeing on whether the government is tyrannical or not. Granted, there
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might be easy cases, like a military coup d'etat or a President who suddenly tried to
assume dictatorial powers, but tyranny doesn't only happen that way. Hitler, after all, was
elected fair and square in the beginning, yet pretty much everyone would agree that he was
the archetypical dictator against whom revolt would be justified.
This is a question that is of more than just academic importance. Already, there are
news reports that large numbers of Americans--as many as 300,000 according to some
estimates--have organized themselves into militia companies whose stated purpose is to
resist a tyrannical government. These groups are inspired by a mixture of anger over recent
gun-control laws and law enforcement activities, and exaggerated fears that the federal
government intends to abandon the Constitution and establish a "new world order"
government.[210] And although there is every reason to believe that the vast majority of
"militia movement" members are law-abiding citizens, some on the movement's fringes are
talking openly about armed rebellion.[211]
Many of these individuals are very familiar with the Second Amendment, and with
Standard Model scholarship, but most are sadly lacking in understanding about what the
Framers would have considered a tyrannical government. As I have said elsewhere,
revolting against taxation without representation is not the same as revolting against
taxation, period.[212] But without a proper grounding in this subject, there are twin risks.
One is that some citizens will think it is time to revolt when it is not, thus exposing the
nation to enormous turmoil, loss of life, and economic damage where it is not justified--and
perhaps creating a backlash against the right to keep and bear arms. The other (perhaps less
likely in light of that streak of anarchy that seems part of our American culture) is that
many citizens will not think that it is time to revolt when it is. Assuming that a would be
Hitler (or his probably very different-looking American equivalent) were then gathering
power, the consequences of such a failure could be even worse than the consequences of an
unjustified rebellion. And, worst of all, the former could precede the latter, given the way in
which such things often work. Unsuccessful revolts are often used as an excuse for the kind
of "temporary" repression that breeds dictatorship.[213] So educating people about not only
the right to keep and (p.507)bear arms, but the circumstances in which the underlying reason
for that right might emerge, could be essential.
At the moment, the risk of a misguided revolt still seems fairly remote, but that is the
time to take appropriate steps. Standard Model scholars need to develop this aspect of their
theories. Theories, even theories of constitutional law professors, have consequences.
Indeed, the growth of the militia movement is itself an unintended consequence of antigun
arguments that the Second Amendment only protects the right to belong to a militia--for
that movement has its roots in individuals who organized their militias in response to just
this argument.
Now is not the place for me to address such issues at any more length; this "brief"
survey of the field is already too long. But I would suggest that a place to start should be
with the original organic document of our nation, the Declaration of Independence. The
principles laid out there, and its registry of complaints against King George III, represent a
good starting point for discussion of what constitutes a legitimate revolution, as opposed to
a mere "rebellion" or "insurrection." And, although modern-day government-bashers would
probably disagree, a careful reading of that document will make clear how different our
government is from the one that the Framers revolted against. At the core of most of the
Declaration's complaints is lack of political participation by the colonists. Our modern
society, despite its ills, does not suffer from a lack of political participation; arguably, it
suffers from too much.[214] But whether they now like it or not, the government that we
have today is the government that most Americans at least thought they wanted. And it is
one that they can change, without a revolution, if that is what they really want.
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VI. CONCLUSION
In the preceding pages, I have tried to lay out the two main schools of thought
regarding the Second Amendment's right to keep and bear arms. As readers will recognize
by now, I believe that the mainstream view that I have called the Standard Model has the
better of the debate. But that is only half true.
Standard Model scholars dominate the academic literature on the Second Amendment
almost completely. But their views are much less represented in the more popular media,
where the "states' rights" view seems still to be dominant. (p.508)Perhaps this reflects the
notorious "liberal bias" of the media, though frankly I doubt that. Instead, I am afraid that it
has to do with a central failing of American academia: the strong tendency of academics to
talk to one another rather than to outsiders. In some fields, this is inevitable, simply because
no one else is interested. But that cannot be the case where the subject is one as
controversial and contested as the right to keep and bear arms. Instead, I think that it has to
do with the reluctance of legal academics to "go public" with their views.
That is understandable. Scientist Stephen Jay Gould writes in the foreword to one of
his "pop" books on evolutionary theory that "[i]n France, they call this genre vulgarisation-but the implications are entirely positive.... In America, for reasons that I do not understand
(and that are truly perverse), such writing for non-scientists lies immured in
deprecations."[215] I think that a similar dynamic exists in the field of constitutional law as
well. In the field of science, widespread popular ignorance is a very bad thing, given the
many ways in which scientific knowledge is important to our society. But in the field of
constitutional law, widespread popular ignorance is even worse, because Americans are not
simply affected by constitutional law, as even the most unscientific are affected by science.
Americans have responsibilities under the Constitution, and they can hardly be expected to
discharge them if they remain ignorant on the subject.
As long as Americans do remain ignorant, they are likely to fall victim to a
"Gresham's Law" of constitutional discussion, in which the bad arguments drive out the
good. Or, worse yet, they are likely to succumb to the same kind of promises of painless
redemption that are mainstays of the diet and fitness industries. In both cases, the outcome
is likely to be bad.
Legal academics cannot force Americans to learn, but we can at least do our best to
see that they have the opportunity, by taking our knowledge public. This doesn't mean
freely opining on just any subject: in fact, I would like to see a world in which legal
academics are consulted by talking-head shows only on subjects about which they have
published scholarly articles.[216] But it does mean talking about our work to people who
aren't law professors or law students.
If the Standard Model scholars had done more of this over the past few years, the
public debate would be very different. Perhaps this issue of the Tennessee Law Review will
circulate widely enough to start the process of educating the public at large about the
interesting work being done in this field. If it does, we will all be better off.
ADDENDUM
I completed this Article several months before the Oklahoma City bombing and the
subsequent focusing of attention on the Second Amendment debate and (p.509)the "militia
movement" groups.[217] While those events do not really affect the analysis contained in
this Article, the public debate has raised a number of questions that I wish to address briefly
here.[218] Fortunately, the editors of the Tennessee Law Review have been kind enough to
allow me to append the following.
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As has been shown above, the National Guard is pretty clearly not the "militia" to
which the Framers referred. As a result, militia groups argue that they are the militia that the
Constitution describes. But they are wrong, too. Although the militia was a body that was,
in a way, external to the state in the sense of being an institution of the people, the
expectation was that the state, not private groups, would provide the foundation upon which
the structure of the militia would be erected. As David Williams puts it, "Republicans did
not intend to leave the universality of the militia to the chance decision of every citizen to
arm herself. The state was supposed to erect the necessary scaffolding on which the militia
could build itself, to muster the militia, and oblige every citizen to own a gun."[219]
This is difficult for many modern Americans, with more European-influenced ideas of
the state, to appreciate. But perhaps the best analogy would be to the institution of the jury.
The jury was intended not just as a protection for individuals, but far more importantly as a
check against overweening state power, since it could always refuse to convict in cases of
political prosecution. The jury was intended to reflect the community, and to function in
many ways independent of state direction. But the state provides the structure within which
the jury operates; no one can get together with eleven friends and simply declare that the
resulting group makes up a constitutional jury. Similarly, although First Amendment
associational rights may provide some protection for individuals who band together and call
themselves a "militia," they do not thereby become the well regulated militia that the
Second Amendment describes. Of course, as discussed above, neither can a select
government-controlled body constitute that militia, any more than such a body could
constitute a jury. One could not, for example, designate twelve members of the Los Angeles
Police Department as the "jury" to hear police brutality lawsuits and by so doing comply
with the Seventh Amendment's right of trial by jury in civil actions--nor is it easy to
imagine anyone who would think that such an approach made sense. The same is true of
(p.510)the militia: not just any armed body is capable of doing the militia's constitutional job.
Rather, it must be representative of--in fact, it must be--the community.
Militia groups are even farther off base when they make arguments based on the right
of revolt. There is little question that the Framers believed that citizens had the right to
revolt against a tyrannical government; after all, they had done so themselves. And, as I
have mentioned earlier, Framing-era state constitutions explicitly enshrine such a right as
well.[220] Nor is there much room to doubt that an important purpose of the Second
Amendment was to make such a revolt possible, in the last extremity. But the militia
movement--or at least those fringe elements talking about armed revolt--has it seriously
wrong if they think that today's circumstances justify a revolt.
There are two reasons for this. The first is that the primary way in which the militia
was intended to serve as a bulwark against oppression was passive. Since, at the time of the
framing, the primary means of executing the law or quelling insurrection was by calling out
the militia, a simple refusal on the part of the militia to perform its duties would be enough
to frustrate tyranny pretty thoroughly. Obviously, this does not apply to private groups
without state sanction, since they would not be called out as groups to enforce the law
anyway. Second, and more importantly, today's theorists of revolt pay insufficient attention
to the Framers' thoughts on the subject. A good short description follows:
This right of resistance is the second general result of entrusting force to the militia. It is the
only purpose of the Second Amendment explicitly mentioned during its discussion in
Congress....
Republicans were aware of the danger implicit in vouchsafing this right of resistance
in the citizenry and sensitive to the charge that they were inciting violence. They developed
a number of limits on the right: It must be a product of the "body" of the people, i.e., the
great majority acting by consensus; it must be a course of last resort; its inspiration must be
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a commitment to the common good; and its object must be a true tyrant, committed to
large-scale abuse, not merely randomly unjust or sinful in private life. An uprising that
failed to meet these criteria was considered an illegitimate rebellion, rather than an act of
true republican resistance.[221]

Thus, there can be no claim--despite what some militia theorists, and some militia critics,
maintain--that the Second Amendment guarantees a right for any individual to declare war
against the federal government whenever he or she thinks the government is unjust. Quite
the contrary. It should also be obvious that those talking armed revolt today do not meet any
part of the test set out above.
There are two important points to be taken from the preceding. First, constitutional
theory matters, and not just to professors of constitutional law. The proper understanding of
the Second Amendment, as embodied in its history and (p.511)explained in the academic
literature, has taken quite a beating at the hands of both pro- and anti-gun advocates, with
unfortunate consequences that we see today. The Second Amendment creates an individual
right to arms; the "militia" language neither expands nor contracts that right.[222] In light of
the Framers' understanding, this makes sense: the armed citizenry was the body from which
the well regulated militia was to be drawn, but the right of revolt could not be exercised by
individual citizens or small groups, only by the people as a whole.
Unfortunately, some gun-control proponents have promulgated the notion that the
Second Amendment protects only a militia; many pro-gun activists have responded by
forming militias in the hopes that doing so would somehow expand their constitutional
rights. This, coupled with misunderstanding of the purpose of the Second Amendment on
the part of both groups, has produced a situation that may still prove dangerous. And that is
the second lesson: Be careful what you advocate in terms of constitutional principles,
because people may listen to you.
My final observation has less to do with constitutional law than with good manners as
applied to constitutional law. It has been my experience, as a constitutional scholar who has
written on Second Amendment issues, that I have gotten a much greater response from
members of the non-academic community regarding those topics than when I have written
on, say, the Commerce Clause.[223] It has also been my experience that although a few of
the individuals who have contacted me could fairly be classified as "nuts," the vast majority
have been intelligent, well-read, and polite. Many of them have been far more
knowledgeable about the Second Amendment, its history, its caselaw, and its academic
treatment than are most professors of constitutional law.
Nonetheless, in popular media discussions of the subject, and in casual conversation
among academics and journalists, such individuals are routinely written off quite unfairly as
either nuts or dupes of the National Rifle Association. I will not belabor this point, as it has
been addressed admirably by Doug Laycock in his Vicious Stereotypes in Polite Society.
[224] But I do want to stress that such stereotyping of individuals based on their views is
itself a form of polarizing "hate speech," just as much as attacks based on racial prejudice or
paranoid distrust of (p.512)the government. In fact, such stereotyping and marginalization
themselves promote paranoia and conspiracy theories. After all, many may believe that a
system that ignores or trivializes their views--even when those views are in fact wellfounded--is unlikely to have their best interests at heart, or even to be truly democratic.
I fear that the bad habit of trivializing and disdaining popular opinion regarding the
Constitution--particularly when that opinion comes disproportionately from rural workingclass white males--represents an unfortunate legacy of the Civil Rights struggle. The
academic and government elites were right then, and their more populist critics were wrong.
But being right once is not the same as being right always. That is easy to forget, of course,
as there are few pleasures more insidiously addictive than the belief in one's own moral and
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intellectual superiority. But it remains true nonetheless. And when, as so many
commentators today argue, the elites seem to have captured a disproportionate share of
political and economic power,[225] treating the Constitution, too, as a preserve of the elite
is likely to produce great resentment, and to produce a dangerous loss of legitimacy. I fear
that it has done both.
Interestingly, the adoption of Standard Model jurisprudence by the Supreme Court
might do a great deal to ease the distrust and polarization that I have mentioned, and even to
make sensible gun controls easier. So far, the barriers to gun control have been political, not
constitutional. Those opposing gun control have been motivated in no small part by the fear
that each measure represents a step toward confiscation. If adopted, the Standard Model
approach would go a long way toward easing those fears, by protecting an individual right
to arms. But because the Standard Model approach permits many reasonable limits on gun
ownership and gun wearing, most genuine gun control efforts--those not aimed at
confiscation--would pass muster. Furthermore, because the Standard Model approach is
visibly rooted in the text, purposes and history of the Constitution, it is likely to be regarded
as constitutionally legitimate. Though the importance of this last point has been
underestimated in recent years, it is no small thing.
With the growing division in American society along lines of class, race, education,
and age, and with the approach of a millennium (something that, if history is any guide,
tends to encourage the growth of odd beliefs and political movements) what we need is
more discussion and better manners, not efforts to cut off discussion using bad manners.
And if our system of government is to retain the loyalty of its citizens, it must pay far more
attention to questions of legitimacy than it has in recent years. I hope that this edition of the
Tennessee Law Review, and my own small contribution to it, will play a role in promoting
both, and I invite readers to take up the challenge and do the same.
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REV. 1045 (1990). See also Glenn H. Reynolds, Penumbral Reasoning on the Right, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1333
(1992) (criticizing Bork and other "right wing" constitutional theorists for inconsistency in interpretive
technique).
[7] See, e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE & MICHAEL C. DORF, ON READING THE CONSTITUTION 110-11
(1991) (arguing that under the Ninth Amendment the right to engage in "unconventional sexual behavior" is
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"required by the Constitution").
[8] See infra note 18.
[9] See, e.g., U.S. Cong. House of Representatives, Hearings on High Energy Physics, Comm. on
Science, Science Subcomm., January 26, 1995, available: LEXIS-NEXIS Library, CURNWS file (testimony of
Dr. Frank S. Merrit, University of Chicago, Enrico Fermi Institute) (describing "Standard Model"). For a more
popularly-oriented treatment see Circles of the Mind, THE ECONOMIST, May 1, 1993, at 90.
[10] See Glenn H. Reynolds, Chaos and the Court, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 110 (1991).
[11] Indeed, the Court had rejected such a right in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
[12] See Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 493 (1954) (holding the right to integrated schools
constitutionally protected).
[13] William Van Alstyne, The Second Amendment and the Personal Right to Arms, DUKE L.J. 1236,
1254-55 (1994) ("Indeed, one may fairly declare, [the Second Amendment] is at least as well anchored in the
Constitution ... as were the essential claims with respect to the First Amendment's protection of freedom of
speech as first advanced on the Supreme Court by Holmes and Brandeis, seventy years ago.").
[14] U.S. CONST. amend. II.
[15] Sanford Levinson's The Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99 YALE L.J. 637 (1989), is so titled
because of the contrast between the extensive discussion of the Second Amendment in the popular press and its
near-complete marginalization by the academy up to that point. Levinson notes:
To grasp the difference, one might simply begin by noting that it is not at all unusual for the Second
Amendment to show up in letters to the editors of newspapers and magazines. That judges and
academic lawyers, including the ones who write casebooks, ignore it is most certainly not evidence
for the proposition that no one cares about it.
Id. at 641 (footnote omitted). Levinson explains this gap by reference to cultural and political differences
between the great mass of Americans and those who dominate elite discussion of legal issues:
I cannot help but suspect that the best explanation for the absence of the Second Amendment from the
legal consciousness of the elite bar, including that component found in the legal academy, is derived
from a mixture of sheer opposition to the idea of private ownership of guns and the perhaps
subconscious fear that altogether plausible, perhaps even "winning," interpretations of the Second
Amendment would present real hurdles to those of us supporting prohibitory regulation.
Id. at 642 (footnote omitted).
[16] Don B. Kates, Jr., Handgun Prohibition and the Original Meaning of the Second Amendment, 82
MICH. L. REV. 204 (1983) [hereinafter Kates, Original Meaning].
[17] Levinson, supra note 15.
[18] See, e.g., Akhil R. Amar, The Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, 101 YALE L.J. 1193,
1205-11, 1261-62 (1992); Akhil R. Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131, 1164
(1991) [hereinafter Amar, Constitution]; Robert J. Cottrol & Raymond T. Diamond, The Second Amendment:
Toward an Afro-Americanist Reconsideration, 80 GEO. L.J. 309 (1991) [hereinafter Cottrol & Diamond, AfroAmericanist Reconsideration]; Stephen P. Halbrook, What the Framers Intended: A Linguistic Analysis of the
"Right to Bear Arms," 49 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 151 (1986); Kates, Original Meaning, supra note 16; Don
B. Kates Jr., The Second Amendment: A Dialogue, 49 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 143 (1986) [hereinafter Kates,
Dialogue]; Don B. Kates Jr., The Second Amendment and the Ideology of Self-Protection, 9 CONST.
COMMENTARY 87 (1992) [hereinafter Kates, Self Protection]; Levinson, supra note 15; Robert E. Shalhope,
The Armed Citizen in the Early Republic, 49 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 125 (1986); Van Alstyne, supra note
13; Robert J. Cottrol & Raymond T. Diamond, The Fifth Auxiliary Right, 104 YALE L.J. 995 (1995) [hereinafter
Cottrol & Diamond, Fifth Auxiliary Right] (reviewing JOYCE L. MALCOLM, THE ORIGINS OF AN ANGLO
AMERICAN RIGHT (1994)); F. Smith Fussner, That Every Man Be Armed: The Evolution of a Constitutional
Right, 3 CONST. COMMENTARY 582 (1986) (book review); Joyce L. Malcolm, That Every Man Be Armed: The
Evolution of A Constitutional Right, 54 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 452 (1986) (book review); see also James G.
Pope, Republican Moments: The Role of Direct Popular Power in the American Constitutional Order, 139 U.
PA. L. REV. 287, 328 (1990); Elaine Scarry, War and the Social Contract: Nuclear Policy, Distribution, and the
Right to Bear Arms, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1257 (1991); David C. Williams, Civic Republicanism and the Citizen
Militia: The Terrifying Second Amendment, 101 YALE L.J. 551 (1991).
[19] According to a brief filed by the group Academics for the Second Amendment, "[o]f 41 law review
articles published since 1980 which offer substantial discussion of the Amendment," all but four take the
individual rights position. Amicus Curiae Brief of Academics for the Second Amendment at 7 n.4, United States
v. Lopez, 114 S. Ct. 2097 (1994) (93-1260) [hereinafter Lopez Brief].
[20] Kates, Original Meaning, supra note 16, at 218.
[21] Id.; see also Van Alstyne, supra note 13, at 1237-38.
[22] Van Alstyne, supra note 13, at 1242. Or as Professors Cottrol & Diamond put it:
To begin with, the first clause, discussing the well-regulated militia, seems to be the dependent
clause. According to this reading, a well-regulated militia depends on the right of the people to keep
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and bear arms. The language does not support the opposite reading, that the right of the people to
keep and bear arms depends on the maintenance or preservation of a well-regulated militia. It should
also be noted that the Amendment has two parts: (1) an observation, or perhaps a cautionary note ("A
well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State") and (2) a command or legal
requirement ("the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed"). The plain
language of the first clause appears to impose no legal requirement or restriction on the federal
government. Only the second clause indicates a right that the government cannot infringe.
Cottrol & Diamond, Fifth Auxiliary Right, supra note 18, at 1002.
[23] Id.
[24] See JOYCE L. MALCOLM, TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS 119 (1994).
[25] "That the subjects which are Protestants may have Arms for their Defence suitable to their
Conditions and as allowed by law." English Bill of Rights of 1689, quoted in MALCOLM, supra note 24, at 119.
[26] MALCOLM, supra note 24, at 135-64. See also STEPHEN P. HALBROOK, A RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS
1-17 (1989) (describing uproar over British efforts to disarm the citizens of Boston, and portrayal of these
efforts as a violation of the rights of Englishmen); Joyce L. Malcolm, The Right of the People to Keep and Bear
Arms: The Common Law Tradition, 10 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 285 (1983). The right to bear arms was also
considered one of the traditional rights of Englishmen by William Blackstone. 1 William Blackstone,
Commentaries, *129, *144 (placing right to bear arms alongside right of petition and access to courts of law, as
essential to the vindication of other rights such as liberty and property).
[27] See Kates, Self-Protection, supra note 18, at 99.
[28] See Kates, Original Meaning, supra note 16, at 224 (citing A Pennsylvanian (Tench Coxe),
Remarks on the First Part of the Amendments to the Federal Constitution, PHILA. FED. GAZETTE, June 18,
1789 at 2).
[29] A Pennsylvanian (Tench Coxe), Remarks on the First Part of the Amendments to the Federal
Constitution, PHILA. FED. GAZETTE, June 18, 1789, at 2, quoted in Kates, Original Meaning, supra note 16, at
224 n.81. James Madison approved of Coxe's construction of the Second Amendment in a letter to Coxe dated
June 24, 1789. 12 Papers of James Madison 257 (R. Rutland & C. Hobson eds., 1977), quoted in Kates,
Original Meaning, supra note 16, at 224 n.81.
[30] THE FEDERALIST No. 46, at 299 (James Madison) (Willmore Kendall & George W. Carey eds.,
1966). This language is quoted in most Standard Model articles. See, e.g., HALBROOK, supra note 26, at 100
(quoting Noah Webster); Cottrol & Diamond, Afro-Americanist Reconsideration, supra note 18, at 330. Noah
Webster's pro-Constitution pamphlet states:
Before a standing army can rule, the people must be disarmed; as they are in almost every Kingdom
of Europe. The supreme power in America cannot enforce unjust laws by the sword; because the
whole body of the people are armed, and constitute a force superior to any band of regular troops that
can be, on any pretence, raised in the United States.
HALBROOK, supra note 26, at 100 (quoting NOAH WEBSTER, AN EXAMINATION OF THE LEADING PRINCIPLES
OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 43 (Philadelphia, Prichard & Hall, 1787)); Kates, Original Meaning, supra
note 16, at 228 n.100.
[31] Madison, supra note 30, at 299.
[32] Jefferson is often quoted for a letter that he wrote to a nephew suggesting that proficiency with
firearms builds character:
As to the species of exercise, I advise the gun. While this gives a moderate exercise to the body, it
gives boldness, enterprise, and independence to the mind. Games played with the ball, and others of
that nature, are too violent for the body, and stamp no character on the mind. Let your gun, therefore,
be the constant companion of your walks.
1 THE JEFFERSON CYCLOPEDIA 318 (John P. Foley ed., Russell & Russell 1967) (1900).
It is worth noting that such views are not merely aesthetic, but expressly political. The "boldness,
enterprise, and independence" to which Jefferson refers are characteristics viewed by the Framers as essential to
citizenship in a republic. For more on this link between armsbearing and civic virtue, see Akhil R. Amar, The
Central Meaning of Republican Government, 65 U. COLO. L. REV. 749, 771-72 (1994) (discussing linkage
between armsbearing and full citizenship in American thought from framing to present); Amar, Constitution,
supra note 18, at 1163-73. Cf. Jean Bethke Elshtain, Citizenship and Armed Civic Virtue: Some Critical
Questions on the Commitment to Public Life, in COMMUNITY IN AMERICA 47 (Charles Reynolds & Ralph
Norman eds. 1988). In short, the theory is that
[t]he right of arms is one of the first to be taken away by tyrants, not only for the physical security
despotism gains in monopolizing armed power in the hands of the state, but also for its moral effects.
The tyrant disarms his citizens in order to degrade them; he knows that being unarmed "palsies the
hand and brutalizes the mind: an habitual disuse of physical forces totally destroys the moral; and
men lose at once the power of protecting themselves and of discerning the cause of their oppression."
Thus, when Machiavelli said that "to be disarmed is to be contemptible," he meant not simply to be
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held in contempt, but to deserve it; by disarming men tyrants render them at once brutish and
pusillanimous.
Kates, Self Protection, supra note 18, at 95 (quoting JOEL BARLOW, ADVICE TO THE PRIVILEGED ORDERS IN
THE SEVERAL STATES OF EUROPE RESULTING FROM THE NECESSITY AND PROPRIETY OF A GENERAL
REVOLUTION IN THE PRINCIPLE OF GOVERNMENT 45 (Cornell Univ. Press 1956) (1792) (citation omitted).
[33] 1 THE JEFFERSONIAN CYCLOPEDIA, supra note 32, at 51 (alteration in original).
[34] Patrick Henry, Virginia Debates on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution, in 3 THE DEBATES IN
THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS, ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, AS
RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL CONVENTION AT PHILADELPHIA, IN 1787, at 386 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d
ed., Philadelphia, J.B. Lippincott Co. 1836) [hereinafter ELLIOT'S DEBATES].
[35] U.S. CONST. pmbl.; id. amend. X.
[36] See Levinson, supra note 15, at 651. Levinson discusses "the implication that might be drawn from
the Second, Ninth and Tenth Amendments: the citizenry itself can be viewed as an important third component
of republican governance insofar as it stands ready to defend republican liberty against the depredations of the
other two structures."
[37] 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1897
(Melville M. Bigelow ed., 5th ed., Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1891). Interestingly, this passage from Story-which dates from its original publication in 1833--was quoted by the Tennessee Supreme Court in a case
upholding the right to keep and bear arms under the Tennessee Constitution. Andrews v. State, 50 Tenn. 141,
157, 3 Heisk. 165, 183 (1871); see also Glenn H. Reynolds, The Right to Keep and Bear Arms Under the
Tennessee Constitution: A Case Study in Civic Republican Thought, 61 TENN. L. REV. 647 (1994).
[38] Thomas M. Cooley, The Abnegation of Self-Government, THE PRINCETON REV., July-Dec. 1883, at
209, 213-14, quoted in Levinson, supra note 15, at 649 n.64.
[39] Dennis Henigan, Arms, Anarchy, and the Second Amendment, 26 VAL. L. REV. 107 (1991).
As explained below [the standard model] amounts to the startling assertion of a generalized
constitutional right of all citizens to engage in armed insurrection against their government. This
"insurrectionist theory" of the Second Amendment, in the judgment of this writer, represents a
profoundly dangerous doctrine of unrestrained individual rights which, if adopted by the courts,
would threaten the rule of law itself.
Id. at 110.
[40] Id.
[41] Lewis L. Laska, A Legal and Constitutional History of Tennessee, 1772-1972, 6 MEM. ST. L. REV.
563, 582-83 (1976) (quoting J.G.M. RAMSEY, THE ANNALS OF TENNESSEE TO THE END OF THE EIGHTEENTH
CENTURY 657 (Kingsport Press 1926) (1853)). Laska points out, however, that Ramsey did not identify the
source for his quotation. Id. at 583 n.90.
[42] TENN. CONST. art. I § 1.
[43] TENN. CONST. art. I § 2.
[44] Compare NEW HAMPSHIRE CONST. art. I § 10, with TENN. CONST. art. I § 2.
[45] THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
We hold these Truths to be self-evident, that all Men are created equal, that they are endowed by their
Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the Pursuit of
Happiness.--That to secure these Rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just
Powers from the Consent of the Governed,--that whenever any Form of Government becomes
destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new
Government, laying its foundation on such principles and organizing its powers in such form, as to
them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness.
Id.; see also Dan Himmelfarb, The Constitutional Relevance of the Second Sentence of the Declaration of
Independence, 100 YALE L.J. 169 (1990).
[46] Robert Bork, for example, characterizes the language of the Preamble as "entirely hortatory and not
judicially enforceable." BORK, supra note 6, at 35. Nor has anyone else tried to do much with the Preamble. It
would be interesting to see what would become of existing constitutional law if the Supreme Court gave the
Preamble to the Constitution as much interpretive weight as critics of the Standard Model give the opening
clause of the Second Amendment. That, however, is a topic for another article.
[47] Van Alstyne, supra note 13, at 1243-44.
[48] Id.; see also Cottrol & Diamond, Fifth Auxiliary Right, supra note 18.
[49] Van Alstyne, supra note 13, at 1244.
[50] See Kates, Original Meaning, supra note 16, at 223.
[51] Id.
[52] Id.
[53] George Mason, Virginia Debates on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution, in 3 ELLIOT'S
DEBATES, supra note 34, at 425.
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[54] VA. CONST. OF 1776, art. I § 13.
[55] See, e.g., MALCOLM, supra note 24, at 143:
Pinning down intellectual influence is always difficult, yet when the reliance upon Blackstone is
added to other evidence it seems clear that English attitudes and practices toward the use of weapons
shaped American attitudes and practices. Americans were more consistent, however. Practice and
profession did not diverge in America as they did in England. Professional armies had no "permanent
and perpetual" role in America until 1763. Rather, the settlers' jealousy of their personal right to have
weapons was magnified by what one historian characterized as their "almost panic fear" of a standing
army, a legacy handed down from generation to generation by forbears "who, if they were Southern
Cavaliers recalled Cromwell and his major-generals, and if they were New Englanders the attempts of
the Stuarts to raise regular armies and govern through their sanction."
Id. (quoting KATHARINE CHORLEY, ARMIES AND THE ART OF REVOLUTION 216 (1973)).
[56] See, e.g., Kates, Original Meaning, supra note 16, at 215-17.
[57] Kates describes it this way:
[T]he different colonies imposed a duty to keep arms and to muster occasionally for drill upon
virtually every able-bodied white man between the age of majority and a designated cut-off age.
Moreover, the duty to keep arms applied to every household, not just to those containing persons
subject to militia service....
In short, one purpose of the Founders having been to guarantee the arms of the militia, they
accomplished that purpose by guaranteeing the arms of the individuals who made up the militia. In
this respect it would never have occurred to the Founders to differentiate between the arms of the two
groups in the context of the amendment's language. The personally owned arms of the individual
were the arms of the militia.
Id. at 215, 217 (footnotes omitted).
[58] Id. at 217-18.
[59] Id. at 218; see also Cottrol & Diamond, Fifth Auxiliary Right, supra note 20, at 1012. "Beset by
internal and external threats, early American settlements had very active militias. Settlements made
considerable efforts to ensure the migration of white men capable of bearing arms. The survival of colonies,
particularly in their early stages, rested on virtually universal militia participation." Id. (footnotes omitted).
Cottrol and Diamond go on to note that "virtually universal" included even citizens who were formally
ineligible for militia service. "In most colonies, militia membership was restricted to white men. As a practical
matter, every colony had free blacks, and occasionally slaves, who would participate in the colony's defense
when it was under attack." Id. at 1012 n.74.
[60] See MALCOLM, supra note 24, at 162-63.
[61] Id. (footnotes omitted).
[62] See supra notes 40-44 and accompanying text.
[63] See, e.g., Cottrol & Diamond, Fifth Auxiliary Right, supra note 18, at 1009.
[64] As Professors Cottrol and Diamond report:
Charles II approached the business of disarming potential subversives with caution. One of the tools
used to perform this task was the establishment of a select militia, volunteer units given intensive
military training. Such units were valuable because they received training superior to the often
haphazard drill of the militia at large. They could also be selected for their political reliability. Charles
II, suspicious of the English tradition of the armed population, used this select militia to disarm those
considered "politically unreliable," a category that continued to expand under his reign.
Id.
[65] Kates, Original Meaning, supra note 16, at 216.
[66] Compare MALCOLM, supra note 24, at 4 ("The militia was first and foremost a defensive force and
could not be taken out of the realm. Members were even reluctant to leave their own counties.") with id. at 23
("With the commonwealth threatened by internal insurrections and foreign invasions [after the English Civil
War] the new rulers had ample excuse to maintain a large standing army.... and the country that had always
depended upon an impromptu militia found itself supporting a standing army respected and feared throughout
Europe."). See also THE FEDERALIST No. 8, supra note 30, at 67-68 (Alexander Hamilton); Nos. 19,20, at 131,
135 (James Madison & Alexander Hamilton) (using the word "troops" to refer to members of a professional
standing army, as opposed to the militia, which is made up of citizen-soldiers).
[67] See, e.g., 29 Op. Atty. Gen. 322 (1912). In fact, when the Army wanted to use militia units to chase
Mexican bandits south of the border, Attorney General Wickersham opined that the Constitution prohibited the
use of militia units outside American borders. Id. For a litany of complaints about the militia's unsuitability in
providing the kind of "global reach" needed by a nascent superpower, see Frederick B. Wiener, The Militia
Clause of the Constitution, 54 HARV. L. REV. 181, 189 (1940).
[68] 10 U.S.C. § 311 (Supp. 1988).
[69] 10 U.S.C. § 101(10)(c) (Supp. 1988).
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[70] 10 U.S.C. § 332 (1988); see also discussion of Perpich, infra text accompanying notes 129-32.
[71] 10 U.S.C. § 802(a)(3) (Supp. 1994).
[72] See 32 U.S.C. § 304 (Supp. 1988); 10 U.S.C. § 3261 (Supp. 1994) (setting out oath of National
Guardsmen and requiring that members of the Guard take the oath).
[73] Col. Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., Welcome to the Junta: The Erosion of Civilian Control of the U.S.
Military, 29 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 341, 384-85 (1994) (quoting William S. Fields & David T. Hardy, The
Militia and the Constitution: A Legal History, 136 MIL. L. REV. 1, 2 (1992)).
[74] Note also the following:
Nowadays, it is quite common to speak loosely of the National Guard as "the state militia," but 200
years ago, any band of paid, semiprofessional part-time volunteers, like today's Guard, would have
been called "a select corps" or "select militia"--and viewed in many quarters as little better than a
standing army. In 1789, when used without any qualifying adjective, "the militia" referred to all
Citizens capable of bearing arms.... [So] "the militia" is identical to "the people."
Amar, Constitution, supra note 18, at 1166.
[75] MALCOLM, supra note 24, at 163.
[76] 10 U.S.C. § 101(4)(a) (1988).
[77] See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. § 311 (1994) (classifying the able-bodied male population aged 17-45 and
female members of the National Guard as the unorganized militia of the United States). The state rule is similar,
except that many states include all women. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 31-2-2 to -5 (1975); ARIZ. CONST. art. XVI,
§ 1; ARK. CODE ANN. § 1261-101(b); CAL. MIL. & VET. CODE § 122 (West 1988) (Note that § 554 says male
or female.); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 27-2 (1990); GA. CODE ANN. § 38-2-3(d) (1982 & Supp. 1994); IDAHO
CODE § 46-102 (1977) (Note that § 46-105 (Supp. 1994) authorizes women to serve.); IND. CODE ANN. § 10-23-1 (Burns 1992); IOWA CONST. art. VI, § 1 (amended 1868); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 48-904(e) (1983)
(Unorganized militia includes both men and women.); KY. CONST. § 219; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 190.06 (West
1992); MISS. CODE ANN. § 33-5-1 (1990); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 20-2-2 (Michie 1978); N.M. CONST. art. XVIII,
§ 1; N.Y. MIL. LAW § 2 (McKinney 1990); N.D. CONST. art. II, § 16; OHIO CONST. art. IX, § 1 (1994)
(authorizes "all citizens to serve); OR. REV. STAT. § 396.105 (1994); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 30-1-2 (1994) (Note
that § 30-1-3 authorizes enlistment of females.); S.C. CONST. art. 13, § 1 (amended 1975); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS § 33-2-2 (1994); S.D. CONST. art. XV, § 1; TENN. CODE ANN. § 58-1-104(d) (1989); UTAH CONST. art.
XV, § 1; WYO. STAT. § 19-2-102 (1977); WYO. CONST. art. 17, § 1 (1994).
[78] See, e.g., Van Alstyne, supra note 13, at 1254.
[79] E.g., id.
[80] Id.
[81] This is not quite as silly as it sounds. Switzerland, for example, permits individual possession of
weapons that are much more highly restricted in the United States, including howitzers, anti-aircraft guns, and
anti-tank weapons. See DAVID KOPEL, THE SAMURAI, THE MOUNTIE, AND THE COWBOY: SHOULD AMERICA
ADOPT THE GUN CONTROLS OF OTHER DEMOCRACIES 283 (1991). ("The army sells to arms
'collectors' (usually former soldiers) a variety of machine guns, as well as anti-tank weapons, howitzers, antiaircraft guns, and cannons."); id. at 292 (stating that Switzerland allows ownership of "howitzers, anti-aircraft
guns, and other military weapons by anyone who can meet the simple requirements for a license"); id. at 295
("[T]he Swiss are powerfully armed, with everything from handguns to anti-aircraft missiles, and legal controls
range from nonexistent to mild.") Kopel points out, however, that the absence of "howitzer crime"--and the low
rate of violent crime in Switzerland in general--have more to do with cultural factors than with the ready
availability of firearms. Id. at 292-94.
[82] See, e.g., Aymette v. State, 21 Tenn. 152, 156-57, 2 Hum. 154, 158-59 (1840):
As the object for which the right to keep and bear arms is secured is of general and public nature, to
be exercised by the people in a body, for their common defence, so the arms the right to keep which is
secured are such as are usually employed in civilized warfare, and that constitute the ordinary military
equipment.
Id. at 156, 2 Hum. at 158. Although the Tennessee Supreme Court in Aymette was construing the right to keep
and bear arms under the Tennessee Constitution, this language was quoted by the United States Supreme Court
in United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178 (1939), a case addressing the Second Amendment. Note that this
language distinguishes between "the object for which the right to keep and bear arms is secured" and the right
itself. Aymette, 21 Tenn. at 156, 2 Hum. at 158 (emphasis added). This is entirely consistent with the Standard
Model analysis.
[83] David E. Vandercoy, The History of the Second Amendment, 28 VAL. U. L. REV. 1007 (1994);
Stephen P. Halbrook, Rationing Firearms Purchases and the Right To Keep Arms: Reflections on the Bills of
Rights of Virginia, West Virginia, and the United States, 96 W. VA. L. REV. 1 (1993).
[84] Kates, Original Meaning, supra note 16, at 259. For a discussion of textual and logical limitations
implied by the original right view, see Halbrook, supra note 18; Kates, Dialogue, supra note 18, at 146-48.
[85] See Thomas M. Moncure, The Second Amendment Ain't About Hunting, 34 How. L.J. 589 (1991).
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[86] Kates, Dialogue, supra note 18, at 146.
[87] Kates, Original Meaning, supra note 16, at 215-16.
[88] Amar, Constitution, supra note 18, at 1164 n.152.
[89] 2 F.3d 1342, 1367-68 (5th Cir. 1993), aff'd 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995).
[90] Kates, Original Meaning, supra note 16, at 266.
Felons simply did not fall within the benefits of the common law right to possess arms. That law
punished felons with automatic forfeiture of all goods, usually accompanied by death.... Nor does it
seem that the Founders considered felons within the common law right to arms or intended to confer
any such right on them. All the ratifying convention proposals which most explicitly detailed the
recommended right-to-arms amendment excluded criminals and the violent.
Id. Given the rather promiscuous designation of felonies nowadays, one might imagine an argument to the
contrary in the case of minor nonviolent felonies, crimes that would have been misdemeanors (or perhaps not
even crimes at all) under the common law. However, I am aware of no Standard Model scholar who has made
such an argument.
[91] For a First Amendment analog, see Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936) (striking
down gross receipts tax on newspapers as a covert effort at prior restraint).
[92] Kates, Dialogue, supra note 18, at 148.
[93] Kates, Original Meaning, supra note 16, at 265.
[I]t has been argued that registration and permissive licensing cannot sustain scrutiny under the
amendment.... By destroying the anonymity of gun ownership, licensing or registration laws would
make it possible for a despot to follow up his coup by confiscating all firearms.
Whatever the abstract cogency of this argument, the concept of anonymity or privacy in gun
ownership profoundly departs from the conditions under which the Founders envisioned the
amendment operating. Under the militia laws (first colonial, then state and eventually federal), every
household, and/or male reaching the age of majority, was required to maintain at least one firearm in
good condition. To prove compliance these firearms had to be submitted for inspection periodically.
Id.
[94] Compare Kates, Original Meaning, supra note 16, at 267, with Halbrook, supra note 18, at 160-62.
Note that the Tennessee Constitution makes the same distinction between "keeping" and "bearing" and that
Tennessee courts--even before the right-to-arms provision of the Tennessee Constitution was amended to make
it explicit--held that the legislature retained the right to regulate the "wearing" of arms. See State v. Aymette, 21
Tenn. 152, 156-57, 2 Hum. 154, 158-59 (1840), at 21 Tenn. 156-57, 2 Hum. 158-59 (distinguishing between
"keeping," "bearing," and "carrying" of arms); see generally Reynolds, supra note 37, at 661-65 (discussing this
distinction). Once again I emphasize the United States Supreme Court's reliance on Aymette in United States v.
Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178 (1939), as evidence that this is a point relevant to the United States Constitution and
not simply the Tennessee Constitution. Id.
[95] Kates, Original Meaning, supra note 16, at 267.
[96] Id.
[97] Id.
[98] See, e.g., Col. Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., USAF, Revolt of the Masses: Armed Civilians and the
Insurrectionary Theory of the Second Amendment, 62 TENN. L. REV. 643 (1995)
[99] See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 219 (1944) (upholding military order
excluding Americans of Japanese origin from the West Coast). See also Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S.
81, 102 (1943) (upholding earlier curfew applying to American citizens of Japanese descent).
[100] See generally Jonathan Clarke, Chechnya is Caution for Bosnia Hawks, MEMPHIS COMM. APP.,
Jan. 29, 1995, at 4B; David Filipov, Troops in Chechnya Watch Their Backs, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 1, 1995, at
A10; Fred Haitt, Truth of Chechen War Derails Russian Propaganda Machine, WASH. POST, Jan. 29, 1995, at
A24; Steve LeVinge, Bombs Rouse Chechen Town to Enlist; Night Raid Hits Hospital, Schools and Homes;
Angry Survivors Form Militia at Dawn, WASH. POST, Jan. 25, 1995, at A20; Steve LeVinge, Russians Alienate
Potential Allies as They Try to Pacify Chechnya; Villagers Turn Against Moscow After Repulsing Tank Column,
WASH. POST, Feb. 1, 1995, at A15.
[101] See Dianne Solis, Bishop Is Mediating Tense Negotiations Between Rebels, Mexican Government,
WALL ST. J., Feb. 22, 1994, at A14; Dianne Solis, Mexican Dissidents Gather in Chiapas As Rebel Leader
Aims to Build Support, WALL ST. J., Aug. 5, 1994, at A6.
[102] As Sanford Levinson writes, "It is simply silly to respond that small arms are irrelevant against
nuclear-armed states: Witness contemporary Northern Ireland and the territories occupied by Israel, where the
sophisticated weaponry of Great Britain and Israel have proved almost totally beside the point." Levinson,
supra note 15, at 657. Levinson is joined in this view by military expert Col. Harry Summers. According to
Summers, even after the demise of the militia system and the rise of the National Guard, there remains a role for
an armed citizenry as a check on potential tyrants.
The militia may be out of date in the 1990s; the need for "the security of a free state" is not.
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No matter how much those committed to gun control do not want to hear it, the Lithuanian
example once again makes clear that "the right of the people to keep and bear arms" is an integral part
of that security.
Col. Harry G. Summers, Jr., Lithuania Strengthens Case for Gun Ownership, DET. FREE PRESS, Mar. 29, 1990,
at 17A. See also Kates, Original Meaning, supra note 16, at 270:
The argument that an armed citizenry cannot hope to overthrow a modern military machine flies
directly in the face of the history of partisan guerilla and civil wars in the twentieth century. To make
this argument (which is invariably supported, if at all, by reference only to the American military
experience in non-revolutionary struggles like the two World Wars), one must make indulge in the
assumption that a handgun-armed citizenry will eschew guerilla tactics in favor of throwing
themselves headlong under the tracks of advancing tanks. Far from proving invincible, in the vast
majority of cases in this century in which they have confronted popular insurgencies, modern armies
have been unable to suppress the insurgents.
Id. (footnote omitted).
[103] For more on the turgid do-guns-cause-crime debate see GARY KLECK, POINT BLANK: GUNS AND
VIOLENCE IN AMERICA (1991); FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, THE CITIZENS' GUIDE TO GUN
CONTROL (1987). I also recommend David Kopel's excellent cross-cultural study of guns, crime, and gun
control in countries around the world. KOPEL, supra note 81. Kopel's exhaustive research explodes many of the
cross-cultural myths often employed by both sides in the debate over guns and crime.
[104] Levinson, supra note 15, at 657-58.
[105] Id.
[106] Williams, supra note 18.
[107] Id. at 589.
[108] Id.
[109] Id. at 590.
[110] Id. at 590-91.
[111] Id. at 590-94.
[112] Id. at 591.
[113] CASABLANCA (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 1942).
[114] Militia Act, Ch. 33, 1 Stat. 271-74 (1792).
[115] Id. at 271.
[116] David Kopel certainly suggests that the universal military service of the Swiss has such an effect,
though he also doubts that it would be as successful here. KOPEL, supra note 81, at 278-302.
[117] See generally KOPEL, supra note 81, at 303-373 (describing history of firearms ownership and
regulation in United States from colonial times to the present era).
[118] Levinson, supra note 15, at 656 (quoting Don B. Kates, Jr., Minimalist Interpretation of the
Second Amendment 2 (draft Sept. 29, 1986) (unpublished manuscript on file with author)).
[119] See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. XXI (repealing Prohibition).
[120] Glenn H. Reynolds & Don B. Kates, Jr., The Second Amendment and States' Rights: A Thought
Experiment, 36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1737 (1995).
[121] Henigan is identified as the Director of the Legal Action Project at the Center to Prevent Handgun
Violence in Washington, D.C.
[122] Henigan, supra note 39, at 119.
[123] Id. at 120.
[124] Id. at 121.
[125] Henigan is author of two law review articles that adopt this approach. See supra note 39; Keith A.
Ehrman & Dennis A. Henigan, The Second Amendment in the Twentieth Century: Have You Seen the Militia
Lately?, 15 U. DAYTON L. REV. 5 (1989). Former Chief Justice Warren Burger has also made this argument,
although not in a scholarly publication. See Press Conference Concerning Introduction of the Public Health and
Safety Act of 1992, June 26, 1992, available: LEXIS-NEXIS Library, ARCNWS file.
[O]ne of the frauds--and I use that term advisedly--on the American people has been the campaign to
mislead the public about the Second Amendment. The Second Amendment doesn't guarantee the right
to have firearms at all.... [The Framers] wanted the Bill of rights to make sure that there was no
standing army in this country, but that there would be state armies. Every state during the revolution
had its own army. There was no national army.
Id. (emphasis added).
Laurence Tribe adopts a similar interpretation, although his treatment of the subject is rather casual.
According to Tribe, the Second Amendment "most plausibly may be read to preserve a power of the state
militias against abolition by the federal government, not the asserted right of individuals to possess all manner
of lethal weapons." TRIBE & DORF, supra note 7, at 11. This statement is based on less than one paragraph of
analysis, and wholly fails to explore the textual, historical, and structural implications of such a position. It
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appears appropriately enough in a chapter entitled "How Not to Read the Constitution." Id.
[126] See supra section II.C.2. Note that the restrictions on weaponry derived by the Standard Model
would not apply under a states' rights formulation. Linguistically, the notion of a state "bearing" a howitzer is no
sillier than the notion of a state "bearing" anything else. Historically, the common law never recognized
restrictions on the kind of weaponry a government force might possess. See Reynolds & Kates, supra note 120.
[127] See supra section II.C.1.
[128] See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
[129] 496 U.S. 334 (1990)
[130] Id. at 336-37.
[131] Id. at 338.
[132] Id. at 350-51.
[133] See, e.g., McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 402 (1819). For a more extensive
discussion of sovereignty and federalism issues, see Akhil R. Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE
L.J. 1425 (1987).
[134] See, e.g., McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 420 (noting that under the Constitution "the powers of
[the federal] government are limited and that its limits are not to be transcended").
[135] See KLECK, supra note 103, at 34. This view seems inconsistent with the view of relations
between state and federal governments generally held by those favoring gun control (who are usually, though
not always, liberals). As Sanford Levinson has noted, the debate over the Second Amendment creates a peculiar
inversion, with conservatives taking on the approach of liberals and vice versa. See Levinson, supra note 15, at
643-44. Kleck notes:
When the issue is gun control, liberals and conservatives switch places. Many liberals support gun
laws that confer broad power on government to regulate individual behavior, especially in private
places ... whereas conservatives oppose them. Some liberals dismiss the Second Amendment to the
Constitution as an outmoded historical curiosity ... whereas conservatives defend a view of this
amendment that is every bit as broad as the American Civil Liberties Union's ... view of the First
Amendment.
Id. This is just another such case. although a states' rights approach to constitutional affairs generally tends to be
identified with reactionary causes, it is here identified with the "progressive" cause of gun control. Meanwhile,
as Kleck notes, anti-gun control forces wax eloquent, in this context, about the importance of individual rights
and the dangers of overbearing law enforcement officials--complaints conspicuous by their absence in the
context of, say the drug war. The political right, however, has pretty much given up on states' right arguments as
a loser, and the left clings to them only in this one instance, which seems more a case of constitutional wishful
thinking than serious analysis.
[136] 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
[137] See generally DON E. FEHRENBACHER, CONSTITUTIONS AND CONSTITUTIONALISM IN THE
SLAVE-HOLDING SOUTH 47 (1989) (describing John Calhoun's theories of state government power to nullify
federal legislation). See also John C. Calhoun, A Disquisition on Government and a Discourse on the
Constitution and Government of the United States, in 1 THE WORKS OF JOHN C. CALHOUN 1, 168-81 (Richard
K. Cralle ed., 1851).
[138] For more on this topic, see Reynolds & Kates, supra note 120.
[139] U.S. CONST. pmbl.
[140] See U.S. CONST. art. VII (calling for ratification by "Conventions of nine States"). For a general
history of the ratification process, see DANIEL FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION 175-218 (1990).
[141] According to the brief filed by Academics for the Second Amendment in United States v. Lopez,
"[o]f 41 law review articles published since 1980 which offer substantial discussion of the Amendment, just
four take the state's right-only position. Their quality does not exceed their quantity: Three of the four articles
were written by employees of anti-gun lobbying groups, the fourth by a politician." Lopez Brief, supra note 19,
at 6.
[142] See, e.g., JOHN L. CASTI, PARADIGMS LOST: IMAGES OF MAN IN THE MIRROR OF SCIENCE 12425 (1989) ("[C]reation 'science' joins the long list of other perverse modern 'sciences,' such as 'fashion science,'
'dairy science,' and 'educational science,' all of which can be conveniently subsumed under the heading
'nonscientific science.'... All the hallmarks of pseudoscience ... show up in glorious detail.").
[143] STEPHEN P. HALBROOK, THAT EVERY MAN BE ARMED: THE EVOLUTION OF A
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT 83 (1984), quoted in Van Alstyne, supra note 13, at 1243 n.19 (emphasis added by
Van Alstyne).
[144] Kates, Original Meaning, supra note 16, at 244-45.
[145] JAMES FALLOWS, MORE LIKE US: MAKING AMERICA GREAT AGAIN 142 (1989).
[146] Id. at 143. The language quoted comes from SUSAN S. FORBES & PETER LEMOS, A HISTORY OF
THE AMERICAN LANGUAGE POLICY 116 (1981). Fallows does not cite its original source, but attributes it to
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"immigration specialists" of the early 20th century.
[147] FALLOWS, supra note 145, at 131-151.
[148] KOPEL, supra note 81, at 342-43.
[149] Id.
[150] See Cottrol & Diamond, Afro-Americanist Reconsideration, supra note 18, at 342-49.
[151] Watson v. Stone, 4 So.2d 700, 703 (Fla. 1924) (Buford, J., concurring specially) (emphasis
added). This case is quoted in Cottrol & Diamond, Afro-Americanist Reconsideration, supra note 18, at 355,
along with a number of other cases making the same point. In particular, it is worth noting another opinion
quoted in that work, in which a dissenting judge noted that "the race issue has extremely intensified a decisive
purpose to entirely disarm the negro, and this policy is evident upon reading the opinions." State v. Nieto, 130
N.E. 663, 669 (Ohio 1920) (Wannamaker, J., dissenting).
[152] 32 U.S. 180 (1833) (Bill of Rights guarantees not applicable against states).
[153] 83 U.S. 36, 78 (1872) (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges and Immunities clause
is enforceable against the states).
[154] 92 U.S. 542 (1875) (holding that the duty to protect the right of the people peaceably to assemble
for lawful purposes and the right to bear arms rests solely with the states).
[155] Id. at 553.
[156] Id.
[157] Id. at 552.
[158] Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
[159] Id. at 486.
[160] I do not mean to suggest that Douglas' methodology was wrong. Indeed, I believe that "penumbral
reasoning" is more widely used, by judges of all political persuasions, than is often recognized. See generally
Reynolds, supra note 6.
[161] See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (extending Griswold right of privacy to
overturn laws against sales of contraceptives to unmarried adults); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164-66 (1973)
(holding most state law restrictions on abortion within the first two trimesters unconstitutional based on right of
privacy).
[162] 116 U.S. 252, 265 (1886) (holding that the Second Amendment is a limitation only against the
federal government).
[163] 153 U.S. 535, 538 (1894) ("[I]t is well-settled that the restrictions of the [second and fourth]
amendments operate only on the Federal power and have no reference whatever to proceedings in state
courts.").
[164] See, e.g., Fresno Rifle and Pistol Club, Inc. v. Van de Kamp, 965 F.2d 723, 730-31 (9th Cir. 1992)
("[I]t is for the Supreme Court, not us, to revisit the reach of the Second Amendment.... Until such time as
Cruikshank and Presser are overturned, the Second Amendment limits only federal action, and we affirm the
district court's decision 'that the Second Amendment stays the hand of the National Govemment only.'").
[165] 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
[166] Professors Cottrol and Diamond so argue:
The Cruikshank decision, which dealt a serious blow to Congress' ability to enforce the Fourteenth
Amendment, was part of a larger campaign of the Court to ignore the original purpose of the
Fourteenth Amendment.... The doctrine in Cruikshank, that blacks would have to look to state
government for protection against criminal conspiracies, gave the green light to private forces, often
with the assistance of state and local governments, that sought to subjugate the former slaves and their
descendants. Private violence was instrumental in driving blacks from the ranks of voters. It helped
force many blacks into peonage, a virtual return to slavery, and was used to force many blacks into a
state of ritualized subservience.
Cottrol & Diamond, Afro-Americanist Reconsideration, supra note 18, at 347-48.
[167] 307 U.S. 174 (1939).
[168] National Firearms Act, 48 Stat. 1236 (1934).
[169] Miller, 307, U.S. at 175-76.
[170] Id. at 176-77.
[171] Id. at 183.
[172] Id. at 178-79.
[173] Id. at 178 (quoting Aymette v. State, 21 Tenn. 152, 156, 2 Hum. 154, 158 (1840)).
[174] Id. at 183.
[175] Id. at 177.
[176] It is, however, relatively short, and I encourage readers to look it up and go through it themselves.
Since Miller is invoked (often wrongly) by partisans on both sides of the popular gun debate, anyone seriously
interested in the subject should be familiar with its text. Having done so, readers will probably be amazed at the
scope of the claims made about Miller by "pop" commentators on both sides of the issue.
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[177] 21 Tenn. 152, 2 Hum. 158 (1840).
[178] Id. at 156, 2 Hum. at 158.
[179] United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178 (1939).
[180] TENN. CONST. art. I, § 26.
[181] The Aymette opinion itself, however, states that the Tennessee provision was adopted "in the same
view" as was the Second Amendment. Aymette, 21 Tenn. at 155, 2 Hum. at 157.
[182] 50 Tenn. 141, 3 Heisk. 165 (1871).
[183] ROBERT COTTROL, GUN CONTROL AND THE CONSTITUTION: THE COURTS, CONGRESS, AND
THE SECOND AMENDMENT (1993).
[184] TENN. CONST. art. I, § 26. Note that there is no mention of militia here--the subject of the militia
is addressed elsewhere, in Article I, § 24, which provides:
That the sure and certain defense of a free people, is a well regulated militia; and, as standing armies
in time of peace are dangerous to freedom, they ought to be avoided as far as the circumstances and
safety of the community will admit; and that in all cases the military shall be kept in strict
subordination to the civil authority.
TENN. CONST. art. I § 24. Thus, the "dual purpose" language of the Second Amendment-- focusing on both the
importance of a militia as a counterweight to a standing army, and the right of the people to be armed--is in the
Tennessee Constitution separated into distinct provisions, though both purposes are preserved.
[185] See, e.g., Andrews v. State, 50 Tenn. 141, 3 Heisk. 165 (1871); Aymette v. State, 21 Tenn. 152, 2
Hum. 154 (1840).
[186] 21 Tenn. at 153, 2 Hum. at 156.
[187] Id. at 156-57, 2 Hum. at 158-59.
[188] Id. at 156, 2 Hum. at 158. The language limiting the right to whites was added in 1834, when
tensions over slavery were high, and removed in 1870. For more on this subject see Reynolds, supra note 37, at
658-660.
[189] See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
[190] 50 Tenn. 141, 3 Heisk. 165 (1871).
[191] Act of June 11, 1870, ch. 13. See Andrews, 50 Tenn. at 146, 3 Heisk. at 171.
[192] Andrews, 50 Tenn. at 143, 3 Heisk. at 167.
[193] 32 U.S. 180 (1833). For the Tennessee Court's discussion of this issue see Andrews, 50 Tenn. at
147-50, 3 Heisk. at 172-75.
[194] Andrews, 50 Tenn. at 156, 3 Heisk. at 182. According to David Kopel, Tennessee has the dubious
distinction of having been the first to pass a law aimed at disarming Negroes that was drafted in neutral terms.
Not coincidentally, it also appears to have been the first place where the "collective right" or "states' right"
argument was used. As always, the argument was a sham.
Even in the states where white supremacy was back in control for good, laws to disarm Negroes now
had to be cloaked in neutral, nonracial terms. Tennessee took the lead in 1870 with creative
draftsmanship. The legislature barred the sale of any handguns except the "Army and Navy model."
The ex-confederate soldiers already had their high-quality "Army and Navy" guns. But cash-poor
freedmen could barely afford lower-cost, simpler firearms not of the "Army and Navy" quality.
KOPEL, supra note 81, at 336.
[195] Andrews, 50 Tenn. at 156, 3 Heisk. at 182.
[196] Id. (emphasis added).
[197] Id. at 154, 3 Heisk. at 179. These were defined, in essentially the same terms as Aymette, as those
weapons actually used by the military, including "the rifle of all descriptions, the shot gun, the musket, and
repeater, and that under the Constitution the right to keep such arms, can not be infringed or forbidden by the
Legislature." Id. at 154, 3 Heisk. at 179; see also Aymette, 21 Tenn. at 159, 2 Hum. at 160-61.
[198] Andrews, 50 Tenn. at 153, 3 Heisk. at 178-89.
The right to keep arms, necessarily involves the right to purchase them, to keep them in a state of
efficiency for use, and to purchase and provide ammunition suitable for such arms, and to keep them
in repair. And clearly for this purpose, a man would have the right to carry them to and from his
home, and no one could claim that the Legislature had a right to punish him for it, without violating
this clause of the Constitution.
But farther than this, it must be held, that the right to keep arms involves, necessarily, the right
to use such arms for all the ordinary purposes, and in all the ordinary modes usual in the country, and
to which arms are adapted, limited by the duties of a good citizen in times of peace; that in such use,
he shall not use them for violation of the rights of others, or the paramount rights of the community of
which he makes a part.
Id.
[199] Id. at 158, 3 Heisk. at 184.
[200] Id. at 158-59, 3 Heisk. at 184.
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[201] Id. at 160, 3 Heisk. at 187.
[202] See, e.g., LEWIS L. LASKA, THE TENNESSEE STATE CONSTITUTION: A REFERENCE GUIDE 57-58
(1990); 25 Tenn. Jur. Weapons §4 (1985).
[203] See United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939); Miller v. Texas, 153 U.S. 535 (1894); Presser v.
Illinois, 116 U.S. 252 (1886); United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875); Andrews v. State, 50 Tenn. 141
[ed. 3 Heisk. 165] (1871); Aymette v. State, 21 Tenn. 152 [ed: 2 Hum. 154] (1840).
[204] See supra Part II.
[205] Id.
[206] Cottrol & Diamond, Fifth Auxiliary Right, supra note 18, at 1025 n.141.
[207] Id.
[208] Id. at 1025-26.
[209] See supra Part II. Neither, I should note, have states' right advocates, but such an oversight is less
surprising in their case. See supra Part III. But see infra text accompanying note 221 (describing requirements
for legitimate revolution under Framers' theory).
[210] See, e.g., Louis Sahagun, A Wave of Distrust in the West, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 3, 1995, at 13;
Christopher J. Farley, Patriot Games, TIME, Dec. 19, 1994, at 48.
[211] Id.
[212] See Glenn H. Reynolds, Up in Arms About a Revolting Movement, CHIC. TRIB., Jan. 30, 1995, at
13. I should stress that the "revolting movement" pun was not my idea; it was inserted by the editors. My title
was "Militia Movement Has It Half-Right," which I think is a more accurate description of the problem.
[213] See KOPEL, supra note 81, at 317. Although as David Kopel points out, this was not the response
to the Whiskey Rebellion. Instead, the local militia was called out, and it quickly put down the rebellion. Nor
were the inhabitants disarmed as a result.
The decisions of the framers of the constitution and of President Washington today seem predictable,
but they ran against the dominant course of world history. A weak federal government, faced with
armed rebellion against its authority, responded by creating a government structure that presumed the
whole citizen population would individually own weapons of war, and would be trained in their use.
Id. at 320.
One wonders whether our present day leaders would live up to such a standard. George Washingtons
seem to be in short supply these days.
[214] See JONATHAN RAUCH, DEMOSCLEROSIS: THE SILENT KILLER OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT
(1994). This is a basic argument of Rauch's book. For different reasons, I agree with his basic point. See Glenn
Harlan Reynolds, Is Democracy Like Sex? (forthcoming 1995 in the Vanderbilt Law Review).
[215] STEPHEN JAY GOULD, BULLY FOR BRONTOSAURUS 11 (1991).
[216] See Reynolds & Kates, supra note 120.
[217] See, e.g., The Right to Bear Arms, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, May 22, 1995, at 29;
Bartholomew Sullivan, Militias, Supremacists Populate Mid-South, MEMPHIS COMM. APPEAL, Apr. 29, 1995,
at 1A. For a critical overview of the post-Oklahoma City media coverage of these issues see Mack Tanner,
Extreme Prejudice: How the Media Misrepresent the Militia Movement, REASON, July 1995, at 42.
[218] Some of these issues are addressed at more length in a prepared statement that I submitted to the
House Judiciary Committee's subcommittee on Crime. Glenn H. Reynolds, Letter to Dan Bryant, House
Judiciary Committee Staff, May 1, 1995 (on file with author; to be published by the Committee).
[219] Williams, supra note 18, at 593.
[220] See supra notes 42-44.
[221] Williams, supra note 18, at 582 (footnote omitted).
[222] As William Van Alstyne of Duke University Law School notes, the right described in the Second
Amendment is the right to keep and bear arms, not the right to belong to a militia. "Rather, the Second
Amendment adheres to the guarantee of the right of the people to keep and bear arms as a predicate for the other
provision to which it speaks, i.e., the provision respecting a militia...." Van Alstyne, supra note 13, at 1243
(1994). See also Cottrol & Diamond, Fifth Auxiliary Right, supra note 18, at 1002 (1994) ("The plain language
of the first clause appears to impose no legal requirement or restriction on the federal government. Only the
second clause indicates a right that the government cannot infringe.").
[223] Based on casual conversation, this appears to be the experience of other Second Amendment
scholars as well.
[224] Douglas Laycock, Vicious Stereotypes in Polite Society, 8 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY 395
(1991). See also Don B. Kates, Jr., Bigotry, Symbolism and Ideology in the Battle over Gun Control, 1992 PUB.
INT. L. REV. 31.
[225] See generally Michael Lind, To Have and Have Not: Notes on the Progress of the American Class
War, HARPER'S, June 1995, at 35.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=960788

